## Explanation/Format

### Discussion Questions

1. How does one determine the best standards to include in a negative topicality argument? What variables are involved when making this decision?

2. How does one determine which word(s) to define (and how to define them) when reading a topicality argument against this genre of affirmative? What variables are involved when making this decision?

3. How does the negative’s topicality strategy change based on the affirmative? How should the negative’s standards change to address each affirmative? How should their definition(s) change? How should their “topical version” and “do it on the neg” arguments change? Consider the following list:

a. Engagement is neoliberal, and neoliberalism is bad. Therefore, we refuse to affirm the resolution because we reject neoliberalism in all instances.

b. The USFG is anti-black. Therefore, we refuse to affirm the resolution because we reject the USFG.

c. Police killings of Black Americans are an atrocity. In the present moment, this issue should be our exclusive topic of concern. Therefore, we refuse to affirm the resolution because we are investing all of our energy into protesting the police killings of Black Americans.

d. The People’s Republic of China has (and is still) engaged in violent colonialism in Africa. Therefore, we refuse to affirm the resolution because we reject colonialism in all instances.

e. Debate is structured to exclude the perspectives of Indigenous people. Therefore, we refuse to affirm the resolution because we reject debate’s exclusion of Indigenous perspectives.

f. Nothing is real. Therefore, we refuse to affirm the resolution because it isn’t real and our attempts to affirm it will inevitably be meaningless.

### Mini-Debate

1. Review the 1AC.

2. Review the negative materials. Construct a 1NC Topicality shell vs. the Knowing China 1AC. First, determine which definition(s) to include in the 1NC. Second, determine which supporting standards to include in the 1NC. Students may include no more than three definition cards and no more than two standard cards.

3. Review the affirmative materials. Prepare to extend the 2AC’s arguments against a 2NC that extends topicality.

4. One student will be selected to represent the affirmative and one student will be selected to represent the negative. The format of the debate is as follows:

1AC — assumed

CX of 1AC — 2 minutes

1NC — assumed (as constructed by the student)

CX of 1NC — 2 minutes

2AC — assumed (just the frontline — no supplemental disads)

CX of 2AC — 2 minutes

2NC — 6 minutes

CX of 2NC — 2 minutes

1AR — 3 minutes

2NR — 4 minutes

2AR — 4 minutes

## Affirmative Materials

### 1AC — Knowing China

#### First, the resolution tasks the affirmative with formulating plans for more United States federal government economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China. The process of constructing these plans relies on a self-delusional methodology that attempts to “*know China*” by objectively studying it. We refuse to participate in this project.

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A Case for Watching China Watching

Critical epistemological reflection on the field of China’s international relations is anything but trivial. At one level, some measure of self-reflectivity is not only necessary but also unavoidable. It pervades all literary works, as literature is always implicitly a reflection on literature itself. 25 All forms of knowledge contain within themselves some conscious or unconscious, direct or indirect, autobiographical accounts of the knowing/writing self at either individual or certain collective levels. As evidenced in the self-image of positivist knowledge in general, the very absence of critical self-reflection in China watching already denotes a particular way of speaking about itself, namely, as a cumulative body of empirical knowledge on China. The problem is that this scientistic self-understanding is largely uncritical and unconsciously so. If Pierre Macherey is right that what a work does not say is as important as what it does say, 26 then this curious silence and unconsciousness [end page 4] in the writing of China’s rise needs to be interrupted and made more conscious, a process which Jürgen Habermas calls reflection. 27

Besides, it seems impossible for China watching to watch only China. Aihwa Ong notes that ‘When a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’.28 We may add that it is also self-delusional. China as an object of study does not simply exist in an objectivist or empiricist fashion, like a free-floating, self-contained entity waiting to be directly contacted, observed and analysed. This is not to say that China is unreal, unknowable or is only a ghostly illusion constructed entirely out of literary representation. Of course China does exist: the Great Wall, the Communist Party, and more than one billion people living there are all too real. And yet, to say something is real does not mean that its existence corresponds with a single, independent and fixed meaning for all to see. None of those aforementioned ‘real’ things and people beam out their meaning at us directly, let alone offer an unadulterated, panoramic view of ‘China’ as a whole. China’s existence, while real, is better understood, to use Martin Heidegger’s term, as a type of ‘being-in-the-world’. 29 The ‘in-the-world-ness’ is intrinsically characteristic of China’s being, which always needs to be understood in conjunction with its world, a world which necessarily includes China-bound discourse and representation.

R. G. Collingwood once said that ‘all history is the history of thought’, meaning that no historian can speak directly of hard historical facts without reference to various thoughts about those facts. 30 Likewise, insofar as China cannot exist meaningfully outside of language and discursive construction of it, no study of it is ever possible, let alone complete, without studying our thoughts about it. For this reason, echoing George Marcus and Michael Fisher’s call for ethnography to ‘turn on itself’ and ‘to create an equally probing, ethnographic knowledge of its social and cultural foundations’, 31 this book takes the representation of China (rather than ‘China’ itself ) as its main object of study. It calls for a critical autoethnographic turn in China watching.

#### Second, any plans that call for increased engagement *necessarily* rely on a violent and hypocritical understanding of China that minimizes its agency and attempts to convert it in the Western image. We refuse to participate in this *irredeemably flawed* imperial project.

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Mission impossible (I): the false promise of constructive engagement

Thus far, I have argued that constructive engagement operates, whether in sincerity or out of expediency, on a normative goal of converting the Chinese Other in the EU’s self-image. This normative project, similar to many liberal attempts to assimilate difference in international relations, sets itself up for a fall. Its overly ambitious goal of transforming China, for all its normative appeal, is mission impossible.

The reasons for this are several. To begin with, while there is a constant normative undertone associated with “constructive engagement,” the term also serves as a convenient grab bag for an array of China policies pursued by a number of governments for various purposes during different [end page 48] periods. That is, policy varies not only across different countries, but also between successive governments within a given country. As a consequence, constructive engagement is a vague, ill-defined policy concept in theory, and is inevitably fraught with contradictions and inconsistency in practice. Although it officially seeks to integrate and transform China, in reality it is more often than not a product of necessity and compromise. As Algieri (2008: 77) puts it,

European foreign policy towards China is, when it comes to democracy promotion and the human rights dimension, clearly incoherent. The EU argues that a policy of cooperative engagement of China is most suitable for European interests—but behind this approach lies the very pragmatic conviction that the costs of non-cooperation with China cannot be afforded.

Indeed, Kagan (2004) suggests that the so-called “normative power” of the EU itself is a virtue made out of necessity, namely, the relative military weakness of the EU. As such, it cannot function without the security guarantee of US military power. Both its inherent concern with and dependence upon power thus make the policy of constructive engagement, to paraphrase Wood (2009a), more of a normal policy than a normative policy.

This is of course not to single out “constructive engagement” for criticism, as the same can be said of almost any foreign policy. Yet, given that constructive engagement takes upon itself a normative goal of transforming China, its internal inconsistency seems less forgivable. It is argued that “normative power can only be applied credibly under a key condition: consistency” (Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis, quoted in Manners, 2008: 56). But consistency is precisely what is lacking in EU-China policy. In any case, by preaching lofty ideals on the one hand and refusing to sacrifice economic, strategic, and political interests of the EU on the other, constructive engagement smacks of hypocrisy. Commenting on France’s two-pronged policy of playing the Tibetan human rights card and at the same time pursuing economic trade relations with China, Chinese scholar Feng Zhongping was quoted in China Daily (2008) as saying that “China doesn’t want the West to think that ‘OK, we will meet the Dalai Lama and business will go on as usual’.” Similarly, many Chinese see nothing but double standards in the EU’s continued refusal to recognize China’s complete market economy status, even though it has granted such status to Russia (Ruan, 2008: 291; also Li, X. 2007: 109). [end page 49]

If one takes into account the long history of Europe’s encounter with China in the past one and a half centuries, as many Chinese do, this European policy inconsistency is brought into even sharper relief. As Yahuda (2008: 21) notes, for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries the Europeans, despite their professed desire to modernize China, had been unsympathetic to China’s new generations of nationalists, preferring instead to deal with the Qing state—and when that dynasty collapsed—with some kind of “strongman.” What is more, many EU policy-makers are unapologetic about their double standards and policy inconsistency. Robert Cooper (2003), for example, justifies the practice of double standards on the basis that Europe, being a postmodern entity, should differentiate its foreign policy toward other postmodern states from that toward pre-modern and modern states. In his words, “In the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle” (Cooper, 2003: 62). However, the problem is that, as Hyde-Price (2008: 29) notes, “no actor can effectively pursue its own interests in a diverse and pluralist international system, and claim to be ‘doing good’ by others, at the same time.”

The upshot of policy inconsistency and double standards in both contemporary and historical contexts is that the credibility of “normative power Europe” has been found wanting, which in turn undercuts the efficacy of constructive engagement. Though not solely responsible for the lack of “hoped transformation” in China, there is little doubt that the lack of consistency in the practice of constructive engagement is central to understanding China’s “failure” to live up to European expectations.

Also contributing to this problem is the failure of “constructive engagement” to recognize the agency of China as a relatively independent subject in international relations. While China’s importance as an emerging economic and geopolitical power has long been widely recognized, until today, its role as an international agency with the ability to think and respond to international stimulus has yet to be fully appreciated. Although the rhetoric of “dialogue” and “partnership” supposedly affords China some measure of equal agency, in reality China has been assumed almost invariably as a passive learner of international (EU) norms. But China is anything but a passive follower. For instance, while European policy-makers see the existence of normative differences between the EU and China, and hence the need for China to learn from the West, China often sees no such difference. As China’s EU Policy Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003) argues, there is “no fundamental conflict of interests between China and the EU.” Although it [end page 50] does acknowledge the existence of differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system, and economic development level, the Chinese document does not see them as a sign of its own normative inferiority. This Chinese self-perception, rightly or wrongly, runs counter to the construction of China in the EU’s self-imagination, and thus greatly undermines the normative starting point of constructive engagement.

My point here is not that with its own subjectivity, China will not learn from others. Rather, Chinese learning from others is likely to take place on their “own” terms, and they are fundamentally capable of deciding from whom they should learn and for what purposes. The fact that there are always many competing Chinese subjectivities makes China’s learning or socialization an even more dynamic and less linear process. As a consequence, there exists an almost inevitable mismatch between what is intended by the EU’s constructive engagement policy and Chinese response to it. Callahan (2007: 801) captures this mismatch well when he suggests that while engagement seeks to socialize China into the international community dominated by European and Western norms,

China is not necessarily learning the lessons that the EU is teaching. Rather than reproducing the Eastern European reform experience of becoming democratic in a peaceful borderless community, Beijing is setting its own standards in order to promote the party-state’s interests: authoritarian capitalism and a multilateralism that preserves national sovereignty.

Moreover, even as China is being socialized into certain Western norms, there is no guarantee that it will behave in accordance with Western or European interests. In the past, for example, China’s internalization of such European ideas as Westphalian sovereignty and nationalism has served to resist European dominance and interference. Today, its embrace of the rule of law, the free market, or even democracy may have a similar effect.

In any case, China’s agency means that EU-China relations are better seen as a two-way interaction, a contractual relationship, or a bargaining process, rather than a one-way street as presupposed by the policy of “constructive engagement.” China’s EU Policy Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003) emphatically stresses the importance of the principles of “mutual respect,” “mutual trust,” “mutual benefit,” “reciprocity,” and “consultation on an equal basis” as the foundation for EU-China relations as well as for its EU policy. [end page 51] By Callahan’s (2007: 787) counts, the word “mutual” appears 19 times in the 2003 EU document A Maturing Partnership (European Commission, 2003) and 26 times in the much shorter Chinese document on China’s EU policy. This interesting contrast should not be dismissed as merely coincidental or trivial, for it seems to indicate Beijing’s desire for an equal and essentially reciprocal relationship with the EU. As shown in its EU policy paper, China is able to play a more assertive role by asking the EU to “fulfill a long list of conditions before they could be considered deserving of a ‘strategic partnership’ with China” (Cabestan, 2008: 95). True, such demands, along with other Chinese perceptions of Europe, to some extent betray China’s own utopian wishful thinking about the EU,4 and should bear due blame for the mutual disillusionment between Europe and China. But what this illustrates is that the logic of reciprocity rather than one-way convergence is characteristic of EU-China relations. Without a reciprocal relationship between the EU and China, the latter’s cooperation, to say nothing of its conversion, is unlikely to be forthcoming (Wu, 2007: 88). For instance, when the EU failed to honor what Beijing regarded as a “formal commitment” from the EU (i.e., the lifting of EU arms embargo), China in return decided not to proceed with the ratification of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Callahan, 2007: 780; also Yahuda, 2008: 28).

Another reason why the transformation of China in European image is almost impossible lies in the paradoxical role of the Other in self-imagination. On the one hand, the presence of the Other, seen as a potential moral threat to the EU’s self-identity, calls for the engagement and ultimate conversion of that Other. But at the same time, by virtue of its “existence,” the Other proves to be a useful foil against which the EU self can be constructed and sustained. Should constructive engagement ever succeed in transforming a significant Other such as China into sameness, the very “unity” of the EU self may run the risk of falling apart. Such is the acute dilemma facing the policy of constructive engagement. On the one hand, the success of engagement is measured by its ability to ultimately bring the self and Other into convergence, but at the same time, by removing the self/Other difference, such success would rob the engagement policy of its mission, justification, and raison d’être. Hence the contradiction between the professed goal and the normative foundation of constructive engagement.

#### Third, engagement policies *necessarily* rely on fear and fantasy to understand China. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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At the core of the Western self-imagination is the modern knowing subject. Implying the existence of a certain, objectively knowable world 'out there', this self-fashioning affords the West both the confidence and duty to know and lead that world. When certain knowledge about a particular 'object', as in the case of China, is stubbornly not forthcoming, the self-professed knowing subject then resorts to certain emotional substitutes such as fear and fantasy to make up for the absence of certainty. With fear, one may restore a sense of (negative) certainty about an existential threat 'out there', a threat which seems readily accounted for by the timeless wisdom of realism (and to some extent liberalism). Alternatively, with the subliminal aid of fantasy, the West can envisage an immensely soothing scenario of opportunity, engagement and convergence that carries with it a teleological predictability about how History begins, evolves, and ends.

Thanks to those emotional substitutes, the initial 'inscrutability' of China's Otherness gives way to more comprehensible imageries: it is now either an affront to, or an opportunity for, the Western self and its will to truth and power. Either way, it becomes a reassuring object of aversion and attraction that allows for continued Western self-posturing as the modem knowing subject. Indeed, as evidenced in the two dominant sets of China discourses, the Western self and its Chinese Other are mutually constitutive. [end page 148]

More importantly, such mutual constructions are from the outset linked to power and political practice. At one level, they are complicit in the political economies of fear and fantasy 'at home'. At another level, they are constitutive of foreign policy which in turn helps construct the Other in reality. Consequently, the China discourses turn out to be an integral and constitutive part of their 'object of study'. For example, as illustrated in Chapters 4-5, America's 'China threat' discourse both contributes to, and is reproduced by, the US partisan politics of fear and military Keynesianism. At the same time, this threat imagery helps sustain a containment policy of sorts. By provoking similar responses from China, such a policy ends up participating in the creation of the very threat it seeks to contain.

#### Fourth, this self-fulfilling prophecy is inevitable as long as China is treated as an object to *study* and *engage*. War is unlikely unless we embrace this methodology.

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The ‘China Threat’ Paradigm as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

If changing Chinese public opinion and Beijing's growing assertiveness in foreign policy are better understood in the context of mutual responsiveness, then threatening as they may appear, they at least partly reflect the self-fulfilling effect of the China threat theory as practice. That is, they are to some extent socially constructed by Western representations of the China threat. At this juncture, we may return to the question raised earlier—What's the cost of having an enemy? The cost, simply put, is that perceiving China as a threat and acting upon that perception help bring that feared China threat closer to reality. Though not an objective description of China, the 'China threat' paradigm is no mere fantasy, as it has the constitutive power to make its prediction come true. If this China paradigm ends up bearing some resemblance to Chinese reality, it is because the reality is itself partly constituted by it. With US strategic planners continuing to operate on the basis of the China threat, this self-fulfilling process has persisted to the present day. For example, in July 2010, when China objected to the joint US- South Korean navy exercise in the Yellow Sea to no avail, it announced that its navy would conduct live fire drills in the East China Sea for the duration of the US-South Korean manoeuvres. 329 Meanwhile. a Global Times (a Chinese daily tabloid affiliated with the official People’s Daily) editorial opines that 'Whatever harm the US military manoeuvre may have inflicted upon the mind of the Chinese, the United States will have to pay for it, sooner or later'. 130

All such Chinese 'belligerence' seems to have provided fresh evidence to the 'China threat' paradigm, whose image of China has now been vindicated. 131 Without acknowledging their own role in the production of the 'China threat', 'China threat' analysts thus play a key part in a spiral model [end page 105] of tit-for-tat in Sino-US relations. Mindful of this danger, some cool-headed observers have warned that a US attempt to build a missile defence shield could be reciprocated by China deploying more missiles. Even the highly classified US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report Foreign Responses to U.S. National Missile Defense Deployment has hinted at this possibility. 133 In early 2006, Mike Moore, contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, predicted that if the US continues to weaponise space by deploying a comprehensive space-control system, 'China will surely respond’.134 And respond it did. In early 2007, it launched a ballistic missile to destroy an inoperational weather satellite in orbit. That test immediately caused a stir in the international press, even though it came after Washington's repeated refusal to negotiate with China and Russia over their proposed ban on space weapons and the use of force against satellites. A Financial Times article noted that 'What is surprising about the Chinese test is that anyone was surprised'.135 In a similar vein but commenting on the broader pattern of US strategy on China over the years, Lampton notes that 'Washington cannot simply seek to strengthen ties with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and central Asian states as an explicit offset to rising Chinese power and then be surprised when Beijing plays the same game'.136

Nevertheless, such surprise is commonplace in the China watching community, reflecting an intellectual blindness to the self-fulfilling nature of one of its time-honoured paradigms. This blindness, in turn, allows the justification of more containment or hedging. In this way, the 'China threat' paradigm is not only self-fulfilling in practice, but also self-productive and self-perpetuating as a powerful mode of representation.

One might take comfort in the fact that neither Beijing nor Washington actually wants a direct military confrontation. But that is beside the point, for the lack of aggressive intention alone is no proven safe barrier to war. As in the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the outbreak of war does not necessarily require the intention to go to war. 137 Mutual suspicion, as US President Theodore Roosevelt once observed of the Kaiser and the English, is often all that is needed to set in motion a downward spiral.133 And thanks to the 'China threat' paradigm and its mirror image and practice from China, mutual suspicion and distrust has not been in short supply. 139 A war between these two great powers is not inevitable or even probable; the door for mutual engagement and cooperation remains wide open. Nevertheless, blind to its own self-fulfilling consequences, the 'China threat' paradigm, if left unexamined and unchecked, would make cooperation more difficult and conflict more likely.

It is worth adding that my treatment of Chinese nationalism and realpolitik thinking is not to downplay their potentially dangerous consequences, much less to justify them. Quite the contrary, for all the apparent legitimacy of [end page 106] reciprocal counter-violence or counter-hedging, Chinese mimicry is dangerous, as it would feed into this tit-for-tat vicious cycle and play its part in the escalation of a security dilemma between the US and China. Thus, to emphasise Chinese responsiveness is not to deny Chinese agency or exonerate its responsibility. While the general nature of Chinese foreign policy may be responsive with regard to the US, its 'contents' are not simply passive, innocent mimicry of US thinking and behaviour, but inevitably come with some 'Chinese characteristics'. That said, those 'Chinese characteristics' notwithstanding, there is no pregiven China threat both unresponsive to and immune from any external stimulus. To argue otherwise is to deny an important dimension of Chinese agency, namely, their response-ability.

By examining the self-fulfilling tendency of the 'China threat' paradigm, we can better understand that Sino-American relations, like international relations in general, are mutually responsive and constitutive. Thus, both China and the US should be held accountable to the bilateral relationship of their mutual making. To the extent that this 'China threat' knowledge often denies such mutuality, and by extension, US responsibility in the rise of the China threat, it is all the more imperative to lay bare its intrinsic link with power practice.

#### Fifth, instead of *studying China*, we study *the study of China*. This requires abandoning positivism and beginning from a different starting point.

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China Watching Rarely Watches Itself

These questions may strike many scholars as trivial and superfluous, if not odd. To others they may immediately smack of empty epistemological speculations — surely China watching is about uncovering and accumulating knowledge on China, with its core business centred on understanding key empirical issues that really matter in China’s relations with the world, issues ranging from power, capabilities, interests, intentions and identity to foreign policy, grand strategy and behaviour patterns. Thus, where periodically there have been welcome attempts to reflect on the ‘state of the art’ in China watching, 6 the main objectives of those reflections have been to help ‘build cumulative knowledge’ and to explore some ‘potential avenue for new research’.7 Predictably, such stock taking has been largely positive and self-congratulatory in tone. At the ‘Trends in China Watching’ conference held at George Washington University in 1999, participants seemed genuinely impressed by ‘the diversity of approaches an d perspectives’ in the field, which they regarded as ‘the most valuable asset China watchers have today’.8 Two prominent experts on Chinese foreign policy , Robert Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston, would concur . In their edited book on new directions in this China field, they claim that China scholars are now in a better position to meet the growing demand for sophisticated anal y sis on China’s foreign policy. 9 For still others , ‘the field is doing a good job of keeping up with and interpreting fast- changing developments in China, and… the international “state of the field” can be judged to be healthy and growing’.10 [end page 2]

Growing this field may be, but healthy it seems not. According to Roland Barthes, a ‘healthy’ sign should be honest about its own arbitrariness. Rather than pretending to be ‘natural’ or ‘objective’, it admits ‘its own relative, artificial status’. 11 Judging by this requirement, the IR branch of China watching appears far from healthy. As just noted, amidst an ongoing celebration of its scientific contribution to China knowledge, this field has thus far shown little critical self-reflection required of a healthy sign. True, some China watchers are aware of the limits of their own work and even the problematic status of China watching as objective knowledge. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno lament that ‘the rich comparative and foreign policy scholarship on China’ is ‘under-theorized’, and they call for its better engagement with the ‘theoretical insights of international relations’. 12 David Shambaugh notes that while ‘rich in monographic literature on different periods and bilateral interactions’, the field ‘lacks studies with aggregate and reflective perspectives’.13 In a semi-autobiographical reflection on China watching, Richard Baum admits that objectivity in China studies is ‘an elusive grail’ and that our understanding is often coloured by ‘personal sentiments and emotions’. 14 Such reflections, however, often limited in scope and made in passing, remain a rare commodity.

Such a problem is not unique to IR China watchers. Anthropologists are said to be skilled at ‘probing other cultures’ but often fall short of reflecting on their own.15 Likewise, political scientists, always ready to expose the political and ideological baggage of practitioners, seldom subject their research to similar scrutiny.16 All this, it seems, reveals a common pitfall in human understanding itself: ‘The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of itself: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance , and make it its own Object’, thus wrote John Locke. 17 If human understanding needs to better understand itself, China watching as a particular subset of human understanding should also make itself its own object and allow for self-watching.

In research, watching the self may come in different forms. Autoethnography, for one, calls for the explicit use of the self as a methodological resource in the production of knowledge. 18 In this book, by ‘self’ I mean not literally the personal experience of China watchers (though that is no doubt fascinating in itself), but rather their collective knowledge products, the broader intellectual, socio- political context of their knowledge production, and their underlying ideas and imaginations of themselves as the knowing subject. Thus defined, self-watching in China studies requires not only a methodological shift, but also an ontological and epistemological rethinking (if we suppose that the former can ever be separated from the latter).

A key suspect for the conspicuous absence of healthy self-reflection in China watching has to be the ever-appealing positivism, an epistemological [end page 3] glue which helps hold an otherwise ‘argumentative China watching community’ together. 19 As an extremely influential theory of knowledge, positivism presupposes the existence of an objective reality ‘out there’, independent of our thought but ultimately amenable to scientific analysis.20 Crucially, claiming to have reached ‘the end of the theory of knowledge’, positivism performs ‘the prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from epistemological self-reflection’.21 In this way, the epistemological question of how we know what we know seems no longer necessary. Insisting on a clear distinction between ‘observable facts and often unsustainable “speculations about them”’, David Martin Jones is irritated by the postcolonial effort of ‘exposing representation in literary “texts” or in film and music rather than addressing the empirical realm of social facts’. 22

Rallying around the positivist tradition, most China watchers in the IR field treat China as something made up of such observable facts. However complex those facts may be, and however difficult for China watchers to completely detach themselves from personal biases, it is believed that there is an ultimately knowable Chinese reality. The main task of China watching, by definition, should be about watching China. If China knowledge is indeed objective, scientifically testable, and professionally cumulative, then it would seem meaningless, if not self-indulgent, to dwell on questions such as what China knowledge is, who is producing it, how and for what purposes. 23 Consequently, it is no surprise that few in the China-studies community have shown interest in such philosophical reflections and still fewer are keen on epistemological debates on China watching; 24 such debates, standing apparently in the way of accumulating further knowledge on China, would appear not only unhelpful but needlessly polemic and divisive.

#### Sixth, an affirmative ballot represents a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonization of the latent (neo)colonial desire and mindset that actively shapes the study of China. Put simply, vote aff to *study the study of China*.

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Also, underlying those question is the belief that deconstruction is essentially destructive and thus has little constructive to contribute to China studies. However, as Derrida notes, deconstruction is 'a way of taking a position' rather than merely 'a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-making destruction'.8 By way of deconstruction, this book has hoped to generate both critical and constructive reflections on the way we think about the nature of China knowledge as well as the way such knowledge can be [end page 150] better produced. To the extent that methodology is always implied in ontology and epistemology, my ontological and epistemological critique is not an exercise of esoteric verbal incantation, but carries important methodological messages for China watching, even though such messages could well be dismissed as hollow, mystifying or even alien by conventional standards.

One message from this study is that it is no longer adequate for us to be merely 'China' specialists who are otherwise blissfully 'ignorant of the world beyond China'.9 China watching needs autoethnography or 'self-watching' to consciously make itself part of its own object of critical analysis whereby the necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in perspective. All research, to be sure, must already contain some level of reflectivity, be it about methods of inquiry, hypothesis testing, empirical evidence, data collection, or clarity of expression. And the Western representations of China's rise, predicated on some particular ways of Western self-imagination, are necessarily self-reflective in that sense. And yet, such narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean by 'self-watching'. In fact, the unconscious Western self-imagination as the modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world and refuses to critically look at itself) is the very antithesis of self-watching.

Self-watching, I suggest, requires at once discarding this positivist self-(un)consciousness and cultivating a critically reflective, philosophising mind. 'The philosophizing mind', wrote Collingwood, 'never simply thinks about an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its own thought about that object'. 30 This position is similar to that of 'ironists'. According to Richard Rorty, ironists are 'never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves’.11

In the concluding chapter of his Scratches on Our Minds, Harold Isaacs seemed to have endorsed such 'ironist' approaches to China studies: 'we have to examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations, how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we describe them, and what purposes they serve for us'.2 Back in 1972, John Fairbank put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America's Cold-War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear, a fear inspired not by China but by America's experience with Nazi and Stalinist totalitarian regimes. 13 These examples clearly show the possibility of reflective China watching, but alas, as noted from the beginning, such reflectivity is hardly visible in today's 'China's rise' literature. Indeed, without the trace of a single author, the two dominant China paradigms hinge onto a ubiquitous collective psyche and emotion that is often difficult to see, let alone to criticise from within. [end page 151]

Yet it is imperative that such self-criticism should occur, which entails problematising China watchers' own thought, vocabularies and taken-for-granted self-identity as disinterested rational observers. It requires us to pause and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why we constantly fear China, rather than taking that fear as given: 'We are wary of China because we are wary of China'. Self-watching demands an ironist awareness of the contingency, instability, and provinciality of mainstream China knowledge, its intertextual and emotional link to the fears and fantasies in the Western self-imagination, the political economy of its production, and the attendant normative, ethical and practical consequences both for dealing with China and for serving the power and special interests at home. Put it differently, it requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation of the latent (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalism knowledge and China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and pedagogical guises.

#### Seventh, the affirmative results in better knowledge about China because it fosters critical self-reflection. Learning to accept that there are things we don’t know is important. Demanding that we propose *new plans for increased engagement* requires us to be too arrogant about our knowledge. We choose intellectual humility instead.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China watching: towards reflection and dialogue,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. 152-153)

In this context, self-reflection cannot be confined to individual China watchers or even the China watching community. Never a purely personal pursuit or even a disciplinary matter, China knowledge is always inextricably linked with the general dynamism of Western knowledge, desire and power in global politics. Its self-reflection should thus extend to the shared collective self of the West, its assumed identity and associated foreign policy (China policy in particular). If China can be seen as a being-in-the-world, these issues are part and parcel of the world in which China finds itself and relates to others. But until now they have largely escaped the attention of China watchers. Maybe it is because these are primarily the business of scholars of Western/American culture, history and foreign relations, rather than that of China scholars. After all, there is a need for division of labour in social sciences. True, for various reasons it is unrealistic to expect China scholars to be at the same time experts on those 'non-China' issues. Nevertheless, since China watchers both rely on and contribute to their collective Western self-imagination in their understanding of China, it is crucial that they look at their collective Western self in the mirror. Take the negative image of China's brutal Soviet-style sports system for example. Every now and then, such an image will be reliably brought up to reinforce China's Otherness more generally. But if the ways American young talents are trained are put under the same spotlight, the difference between the US and China is no longer as vast as it appears. 14 In doing so, the previous China image is no longer as defensible as it seems. In brief, the broader point here is that the same China may take on quite different meanings when we are willing to subject ourselves to similar scrutiny. We may better appreciate why China looks the way it does when we are more self-conscious of the various lenses, [end page 152] paradigms, and fore-meanings through which we do China watching. Conversely, we cannot fully comprehend why the Chinese behave in a certain way until we pay attention to what we have done (to them), past and present. Such self-knowledge on the part of the West is essential to a better grasp of China. Without the former, China knowledge is incomplete and suspect.

Yet, to many, self-reflection is at best a luxurious distraction. At worst it amounts to navel-gazing and could turn into 'a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world'.15 Such concern is hardly justified, however. The imagined Western self is integral to the real world, and critical self-reflection also helps reconnect China watching to the 'real' world of power relations to which it always belongs. By making one better aware of this connection, it helps open up space for emancipatory knowledge. As Mannheim notes:

The criterion of such self-illumination is that not only the object but we ourselves fall squarely within our field of vision. We become visible to ourselves, not just vaguely as a knowing subject as such but in a certain role hitherto hidden from us, in a situation hitherto impenetrable to us, and with motivations of which we have not hitherto been aware. In such a moment the inner connection between our role, our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly draws upon us. Hence the paradox underlying these experiences, namely the opportunity for relative emancipation from social determination, increases proportionately with insight into this determination.16

Still, there may be a lingering fear that excessive reflectivity could undo much of the hard-won China knowledge. But again to quote Mannheim, 'the extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality'. 17 Even when that does expose our lack of knowledge about China, all is not lost. Such revelation is not a sign of ignorance, but an essential building block in the edifice of China knowledge. Confucius told us that 'To say that you know when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know—that is [the way to acquire] knowledge'.13 Thus, the knowing subject can emancipate itself from its delusion about its own being;19 the real meaning of ignorance is that one claims to know when one does not or cannot know.

#### Finally, we cannot understand China without first understanding the discourses and representations used to describe it. Our methodology prioritizes questions of ontology and epistemology because there is no “*objective reality*” of or about China. Their disadvantages aren’t neutral descriptions of the world; they *actively create* the world that they attempt merely to *describe*.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“Preface,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. vii-viii)

Among the most reported stories in the first decade of the twenty-first century, topping the list was not the global financial crisis, the long-running Iraq War, or even the 'September 11' terrorist attacks—it was the rise of China.1 These findings, announced by Global Language Monitor in 2011, were based on a study of global media reporting trends among 75000 print and electronic media sources. Were there a similar survey on the issues concerning the international scholarly community, China's rise would almost certainly rank among the most closely scrutinised as well. Long gone, it seems, are the days when an American publishing company did not publish a single book on China for fifteen years.2 With such extensive coverage on China's ascendancy today, there seems hardly a need for yet another study on this subject. Existing commentaries, books, and articles must have already covered a sufficiently wide range of perspectives.

Despite or precisely because of the vast amount of literature on this issue, I feel compelled to join the chorus. However, in doing so this book does not, as do many other books, seek to examine whether China is rising or not, or what its rise means. This is not because I believe such questions are unimportant or have already been settled; I do not. Rather, I believe what China's rise means cannot be independently assessed in isolation from what we already mean by China's rise. Though tautological it might sound, the latter question draws attention to the meaning-giving subject of China watchers. It turns the spotlight on our thoughts and representations of China's rise, which constitutes the main focus of this book.

Though it may appear that way in the eyes of some, going along this path is not a cunning attempt of finding a literary niche in an increasingly crowded field to score some cheap points all the while dodging the heavy lifting of tackling complex 'real-world' issues surrounding China. Nor is it to deliberately court controversy or strike an affected pose of malaise about an otherwise vibrant field of study. To me, this book is a necessary move justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the book rejects the prevalent assumption about the dichotomy between reality and representation. Contra positivism, we cannot bypass thoughts and representations to come into direct contact with China as it is. What we see as 'China' cannot be detached from various discourses and representations of it. Works that purport to study China's rise, as if it were a transparent and empirically observable phenomenon out there, are always already inextricably enmeshed [end page vii] in representations. In all likelihood, those works will then become themselves part of such representations, through which still later studies will gaze at 'China'. In this sense, my focus on representation is less an expedient choice than ontological and epistemological necessity.

On practical grounds, given the inescapable immanence of representation and discourse in the social realm, a proper study of discursive representation is not a retreat from the real world but a genuine engagement with it in the full sense of the words. Perhaps with the exception of sleepwalking or unconscious twitching, no human action (let alone social action) can do without thought and representation. Constructivists are right in saying that words have consequences. But we may add that all social domains and human relationships are mediated through and constituted by thought and representation. China's relationship with the West is certainly no exception. With regional stability, prosperity and even world peace at stake, there is now an urgent, practical need to understand how the various strains of representation and discourse pervade and condition this critical and complex relationship.

For these reasons, this book turns to Western representations of China's rise. In particular, it focuses on two influential paradigms: the 'China threat' and the 'China opportunity'. Commonly held by their respective exponents as objective truth about the implications of China's rise, both paradigms, despite their seemingly contrasting views, are reflections of a certain Western self-imagination and its quest for certainty and identity in an inherently dynamic, volatile and uncertain world. While understandable, such a desire often proves elusive in the social world. With no lasting law-like certainty in sight, the desire for certainty then often comes full circle to two subsets of desire: namely, fears and fantasies. For these forms of desire can provide some emotional substitutes for the holy grail of certainty and truth. In this book, I will argue that the two China paradigms are, respectively, discursive embodiments of these two popular types of emotional substitutes. As such, they are not objective China knowledge, but are closely linked to habitual Western self-imagination and power practice. By probing into the interrelationship between knowledge, desire and power, the book aims to deconstruct contemporary Western representations of China's rise. Although it will tentatively point to some methodological openings for what one might call 'critical China watching', due to its scope and ontological stance as well as limits of space, it promises no ready-made alternative toolkit through which to better understand China as it is. Alas, the 'China as it is' simply does not exist except in our ingrained desire and conventional imagination.

### 2AC — Topicality (Not Framework)

#### 1. We Meet — we are *in the direction of* the topic. The 1AC engages China by studying the study of China. It’s close enough to facilitate a productive debate.

#### 2. Imperialism DA — engagement plans necessarily deny China its agency and attempt to convert China in the Western image. It’s *impossible* to defend a topical plan without defending this imperial project — that’s Pan.

#### 3. Counter-interpretation: the topic is the *subject* of the discussion, but it doesn’t *control* the discussion. “Affirmative” means the team that speaks first and last, not the team that advocates “*for* the topic.” We are a discussion of the topic even if we don’t advocate a topical policy.

#### 4. China Studies DA —

#### A. Their interpretation requires us to embrace a positivist epistemology.

Pan 4 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Australian National University, 2004 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 305)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3

#### B. This reproduces flawed scholarship about China — turns “*topic education*” impacts.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China watching: towards reflection and dialogue,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. 150)

China Knowledge and Self-Reflection

Until now, my focus seems to have been mainly on how not to understand China's rise. While deconstruction is all well and good, one cannot help but wonder: How to study China? If those paradigms are problematic or less than adequate, what are the alternative ways of knowing this important country?

These questions sound reasonable enough. Be it scholars or practitioners, when faced with an apparently unprecedented transition from a transatlantic century to a transpacific century led by the 'rise' of China (and India), one is naturally anxious to know what China is up to and how to best respond to it. Yet, however understandable this desire may be, this book has hesitated to directly volunteer answers to those questions, or at least its implicit answers would be unlikely to satisfy those demands on their own terms. There are several reasons for this. To begin with, I am sceptical of some of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises about what China is and what China knowledge should mean. For example, those questions seem to assume that this book is merely a study of China studies (or a particular section of China studies), rather than a study of China per se. Hence their insistence on knowing how we might go about studying China proper. Yet, from the beginning, this knowledge/reality dichotomy has been problematised. Since there is no China-in-itself outside knowledge, representation or discourse, what we refer to as 'China' must already be coloured by such representations. Without reference to representations we cannot for a moment speak of China or do China studies. Given that China does not exist independently of discourse and that any study becomes part of its object of study, I should say that this analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China in the proper sense of the word.

#### 5. No “Deliberation Skills” Impact — students already learn decision-making skills in school, through life experience, and in other debates. Reading a topical plan *in a particular debate* doesn’t matter.

#### 6. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy DA —

#### A. Their interpretation makes it inevitable.

Pan 4 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Australian National University, 2004 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 306)

More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

#### B. This outweighs — treating China as an object of study relies on the projection of fear and fantasy. This creates mutual suspicion and a tit-for-tat spiral. War is unlikely unless we embrace these representations — that’s Pan.

#### 7. No Predictability Impact. “USFG bad” is a stock issue. If they believe in “switching sides,” they should be prepared to defend the USFG and engagement with China.

#### 8. Knowledge Overload DA — we already have *too much* knowledge about China. Topical debates make this worse because they create more knowledge without challenging the flawed method used to produce it.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China watching: towards reflection and dialogue,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. 147-148)

Amid the ever-growing literature on the rise of China, one paradox can hardly escape our attention. That is, evocative of the amusing saying on the Oxford postcard, the more we write and debate about China, the less we seem to know it for sure. Over the years and after so many dedicated conferences, forums and publications, we do not seem to have come any closer to settling the perplexing questions such as what China really is and what its rise means for the rest of the world. The continuing China debate testifies to this lack of consensus. The editors of a book on China watching admit that as a result of the country's growing complexity, it is increasingly difficult to 'offer assured conclusions about "China" writ large'.3 Even William Kristol, a neoconservative authority on everything to do with international relations, once noted that 'I cannot forecast to you the action of China. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma'.4

For some this lack of certainty is all the more reason to keep on deciphering the China puzzle, but to me it is time to reflect on the ways China knowledge has been produced. As Karl Mannheim reminded us, when people face a bewildering array of divergent conceptions of things and situations, they need to 'turn[s] from the direct observation of things to the consideration of ways of thinking'.5 Throughout these pages, the book has sought to do just that, [end page 147] beginning with a deconstruction of the very dichotomies between things and thinking, reality and representation. It has explored a different set of issues that may come under the rubric of sociology of knowledge: How what we assume we already know about 'China' is not objective knowledge, but contingent representations; how those representations are themselves discursively constructed and worldly situated; and what implications they may have for Sino-Western relations in general and US-China relations in particular.

#### 9. No Slippery Slope —

#### 10. “United States” DA —

#### A. Their interpretation requires us to take for granted the *existence* and *meaning* of “the United States.”

Pan 4 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Australian National University, 2004 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 305-306)

Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" [end page 305] and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt.

#### B. This reproduces the violence of American exceptionalism. So does switch-sides debating. The impact is millions of deaths.

Spanos 16 — William V. Spanos, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Binghamton, 2016 (Written Comments Delivered at the National Debate Tournament, March 31st, Available Online at http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,6851.msg14853.html#msg14853, Accessed 07-12-2016)

I am deeply honored and gratified by this invitation by Joe S[ch]atz, the director of the Binghamton debate team, to address the national debate conference at Binghamton University this year. I wish I could be here with you in person, but since that is impossible, this indirect format will have to do,

I am honored and gratified by this invitation primarily because, despite the fact that my intellectual work has been severely critical of the protocols of debating, it has nevertheless become increasingly a presence in the debate world. And this is evidence that the old system of debate, which privileges disinterest inquiry, has been self-destructing ever since the Vietnam War and, most dramatically, in the wake of the United States' inauguration of it unending global war on terror after 9/11/01.

As I told Christopher Spurlock in the controversial interview we did a few years ago, the debate world is the major source of the American administrative and political class. I meant by this a ruling class whose thinking, despite the antagonist labels—Republican, Democrat; Conservative, Liberal—is determined by a system of argument that, as in the debate world, views the agonizing oppositions of the actual, existential, world in which we live as fundamentally equal, whereas, in obvious fact, they are always unequal. The world implied by the essential debate protocols is, as the protocol that allows debaters to switch sides makes clear, a worldless world, a world devoid of the existential differences that make a difference. The debate happens nowhere. If a debater defies this fundamental protocol in the name of this actual world, he or she is condemned as being a subverter of the democratic community. This worldless world, where, for example, the positions of whites and blacks, or men and women, or the world's minorities and the neoimperial powers have equal weight is also the worldless world of the administrative political class it largely produces.

This alienation and silencing of a voice that refuses to play by the rules of the debate system became tellingly manifest in the notorious recent case of Steven Salaita, an American of Palestinian origins, who, after being hired by the University of Illinois, was dismissed by the university president for his public criticism of the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2014 as a manifestation of criticism against the Israeli government and antisemitism, a dismissal that was also approved even by a prominent liberal Illinois professor who stated that Salieta's engaged criticism of Zionism was "uncollegial," that is, did not conform to the protocols of disinterested debate.

The United States, particularly in the post 9/11 era, has wreaked havoc in the world in name of its Exceptionalism, which, practically speaking, means the disinterested inquiry it has always privileged to oppose to totalitarianism. This havoc is especially manifested in the horrendous destabilization of the Middle East and the damaged lives of the millions of refugees its spectacular "shock and awe" military tactics produced. The topic of this year's national debate concerns the question of decreasing American military presence in the world. To me, this is not a debatable issue, one that implies the equal authority of both sides of it. And that is because, as the modern history of the planet bears incontrovertible witness, Western and, more recently, American military force has exacerbated violence rather than reduced it in that fraught part of the world. The recent terrorist attacks in Paris are exemplary of this.

This is not to say that the US should isolate itself from the urgent problems that face the globe; it is to say, that the solution will require a radically different orientation to them, one that abandons the arrogant Exceptionalism enabled by its democratic/totalitarian binary and acknowledges that it was the West's relentless imperial project in the name of its superiority that by and large produced not only the destabilization of the planet, particularly in the Middle East, but also the fanatic terrorism that a certain segment of that ravaged world has adopted to combat that Western domination. To put this negative positively — and in keeping with my initial remarks about the debate world — the US's interest resides in taking part with the global community of peoples in behalf of transforming the friend/foe or war- to-the-end mentality it has always fostered in the name of the nation state. I mean a community of identityless identities in which, as the late Edward Said put it, "'the complete consort dances together' contrapuntally." Or, in the language of the great Afro-Caribbean poet Aime Cesaire, in qhich

no race possesses the

monopoly of beauty,

of intelligence, of force, and

there is room for everyone at the

rendezvous of victory

### 2AC — USFG Role-Playing Bad DA

#### USFG Role-Playing Bad DA — it forces students to adopt an imperialist perspective and promotes spectatorship, not activism. This turns their “deliberation skills” and “policy engagement good” impacts.

Reid-Brinkley 8 — Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Ph.D. Candidate in Communication at the University of Georgia, holds an M.A. in Communication from the University of Alabama and a B.A. in Political Science and Government from Emory University, 2008 (“The Harsh Realities of ‘Acting Black’: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style,” University of Georgia Ph.D. Dissertation, Available Online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/93057917/Reid-brinkley-Shanara-r-200805-Phd, Accessed 07-09-2014, p. 117-119)

Genre Violation Four: Policymaker as Impersonal and the Rhetoric of Personal Experience.

Debate is a competitive game. 112 It requires that its participants take on the positions of state actors (at least when they are affirming the resolution). Debate resolutions normally call for federal action in some area of domestic or foreign policy. Affirmative teams must support the resolution, while the negative negates it. The debate then becomes a “laboratory” within which debaters may test policies. 113 Argumentation scholar Gordon Mitchell notes that “Although they [end page 117] may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events.” 114 Although debaters spend a great deal of time discussing and researching government action and articulating arguments relevant to such action, what happens in debate rounds has limited or no real impact on contemporary governmental policy making. And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research.

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks:

…the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications”(emphasis in original).116 [end page 118]

The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

### 2AC — Policy Engagement Bad DA

#### Policy Engagement Bad DA — participation in policy discussions re-entrenches structural inequalities by accepting institutional constraints. Withdrawing from policy in order to critique the deliberative setting from the outside is a better activist strategy.

Young 1 — Iris Marion Young, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Pennsylvania State University, 2001 (“Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” *Political Theory*, Volume 29, Number 5, October, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 682-685)

V Constrained Alternatives

Let us suppose that by some combination of activist agitation and deliberative persuasion, some deliberative settings emerge that approximately represent all those affected by the outcome of certain policy decisions. Given the world of structural inequality as we know it, the activist believes such a circumstance will be rare at best but is willing to entertain the possibility for the sake of this argument. The activist remains suspicious of the deliberative democrat's exhortation to engage in reasoned and critical discussion with people he disagrees with, even on the supposition that the public where he engages in such discussion really includes the diversity of interests and perspectives potentially affected by policies. That is because he perceives that existing social and economic structures have set unacceptable constraints on the terms of deliberation and its agenda.

Problems and disagreements in the real world of democratic politics appear and are addressed against the background of a given history and sedimentation of unjust structural inequality, says the activist, which helps set agenda priorities and constrains the alternatives that political actors may consider in their deliberations. When this is so, both the deliberative agenda and the institutional constraints it mirrors should themselves be subject to criticism, protest, and resistance.7 Going to the table to meet with representatives of those interests typically served by existing institutional relations, to discuss how to deal most justly with issues that presuppose those institutional relations, gives both those institutions and deliberative process too much legitimacy. It co-opts the energy of citizens committed to justice, leaving little time for mobilizing people to bash the institutional constraints and decision-making process from the outside. Thus, the responsible citizen ought to withdraw from implicit acceptance of structural and institutional constraints by refusing to deliberate about policies within them. Let me give some examples.

A local anti-poverty advocacy group engaged in many forms of agitation and protest in the years leading up to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act by the U.S. Congress in the spring of 1996. This legislation fundamentally changed the terms of welfare policy in the United States. It abolished entitlements to public assistance for the first time in sixty years, allowing states to deny benefits when funds have run out. It requires recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to work at jobs after a certain period and allows states to vary significantly in their programs. Since passage of the legislation, the anti-poverty advocacy group has organized recipients and others who care about welfare justice to protest and lobby the state house to increase welfare funding and to count serving as a welfare rights advocate in local welfare offices as a "work activity. [end page 682]

In its desire to do its best by welfare clients, the county welfare department proposes to establish an advisory council with significant influence over the implementation and administration of welfare programs in the county. They have been persuaded by advocates of deliberative democracy that proceedings of this council should be publicly accountable and organized so as to facilitate serious discussion and criticism of alternative proposals. They believe that democratic justice calls for making this council broadly inclusive of county citizens, and they think legitimate deliberations will be served particularly if they include recipients and their advocates on the council. So they invite the anti-poverty advocacy group to send representatives to the council and ask them to name recipient representatives from among the welfare rights organization with which they work.

After deliberating among themselves for some weeks, the welfare activists decline to join the council. The constraints that federal and state law have put on welfare policy, they assert, make it impossible to administer a humane welfare policy. Such a council will deliberate about whether it would be more just to place local welfare offices here or there but will have no power to expand the number of offices. They will decide how best to administer child care assistance, but they will have no power to decide who is eligible for that assistance or the total funds to support the program. The deliberations of a county welfare implementation council face numerous other constraints that will make its outcomes inevitably unjust, according to the activist group. All citizens of the county who agree that the policy framework is unjust have a responsibility to stay outside such deliberations and instead pressure the state legislature to expand welfare options, by, for example, staging sit-ins at the state department of social services.

The deliberative democrat finds such refusal and protest action uncooperative and counterproductive. Surely it is better to work out the most just form of implementation of legislation than to distract lawmakers and obstruct the routines of overworked case workers. The activist replies that it is wrong to cooperate with policies and processes that presume unjust institutional constraints. The problem is not that policy makers and citizen deliberations fail to make arguments but that their starting premises are unacceptable.

It seems to me that advocates of deliberative democracy who believe that deliberative processes are the best way to conduct policies even under the conditions of structural inequality that characterize democracies today have no satisfactory response to this criticism. Many advocates of deliberative procedures seem to find no problem with structures and institutional constraints that limit policy alternatives in actual democracies, advocating reflective political reasoning within them to counter irrational tendencies to reduce issues to sound bites and decisions to aggregate preferences. In their detailed [end page 683] discussion of the terms of welfare reform in Democracy and Disagreement, for example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson appear to accept as given that policy action to respond to the needs of poor people must come in the form of poor support rather than changes in tax policy, the relation of private and public investment, public works employment, and other more structural ways of undermining deprivation and income inequality.8 James Fishkin's innovative citizens' forum deliberating national issues in connection with the 1996 political campaign, to take another example, seemed to presume as given all the fiscal, power, and institutional constraints on policy alternatives that the U.S. Congress and mainstream press assumed. To the extent that such constraints assume existing patterns of class inequality, residential segregation, and gender division of labor as given, the activist's claim is plausible that there is little difference among the alternatives debated, and he suggests that the responsible citizen should not consent to these assumptions but instead agitate for deeper criticism and change.

The ongoing business of legislation and policy implementation will assume existing institutions and their priorities as given unless massive concerted action works to shift priorities and goals. Most of the time, then, politics will operate under the constrained alternatives that are produced by and support structural inequalities. If the deliberative democrat tries to insert practices of deliberation into existing public policy discussions, she is forced to accept the range of alternatives that existing structural constraints allow. While two decades ago in the United States, there were few opportunities for theorists of deliberative democracy to try to influence the design and process of public discussion, today things have changed. Some public officials and private foundations have become persuaded that inclusive, reasoned extensive deliberation is good for democracy and wish to implement these ideals in the policy formation process. To the extent that such implementation must presuppose constrained alternatives that cannot question existing institutional priorities and social structures, deliberation is as likely to reinforce injustice as to undermine it.

I think that the deliberative democrat has no adequate response to this challenge other than to accept the activist's suspicion of implementing deliberative processes within institutions that seriously constrain policy alternatives in ways that, for example, make it nearly impossible for the structurally disadvantaged to propose solutions to social problems that might alter the structural positions in which they stand. Only if the theory and practice of deliberative democracy are willing to withdraw from the immediacy of the already given policy trajectory can they respond to this activist challenge. The deliberative democracy should help create inclusive deliberative settings in which basic social and economic structures can be examined; such settings [end page 684] for the most part must be outside of and opposed to ongoing settings of official policy discussion.

### 2AC — Colorblind Debate Bad DA

#### Colorblind Debate Bad — topicality and “switch sides” norms are tools of colorblindness. Traditional models of policy debate exclude alternative perspectives. Meaningful minority participation requires abandoning topicality in favor of performative approaches — empirical evidence.

Polson 12 — Dana Roe Polson, Ph.D. Candidate in Language, Literacy and Culture at the University of Maryland-Baltimore County, Co-Director and Teacher at a Baltimore City Schools public charter school, 2012 (“’Longing for Theory:’ Performance Debate in Action, University of Maryland-Baltimore County Ph.D. Dissertation, Available Online at http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/1027604463.html?FMT=ABS, Accessed 07-09-2014, p. 289-295)

Why We Need Race-Conscious Work

Many people in the debate community question why Black performance debaters won’t just debate like traditional debaters do. There seems to be the feeling that it is a stubbornly willful choice; that performance debaters are somehow selfish because they [end page 289] debate in a stylistically different way from the norm. One respondent showed this feeling: “What they [performance debaters], what they actually want to do is take this, and say, we don’t like this, and we’re going to make you do this instead. And that’s kind of disingenuous to the people that wanna do it this way [traditional debate]” (Scott Smith, interview, p. 23). A similar aggrieved feeling that Black people flout norms they should instead pay attention to, seems to be held about many Black cultural styles, as is evident from the mainstream preoccupation with the baggy pants often worn by young men, particularly young Black men, today.

However, there also seems to be a need on the part of some in the debate community to show that Black debaters can debate like traditional (more often white) debaters do—to show that they can be, or are, just as good. To do so, Black debaters have to debate in the same style as whites to prove themselves. Duane Hartman specifically talked about the expectations of (white) UDL founders: “Because for them it’s like, we have a bunch of really successful white debaters, we want to prove that Black people can do this too. You know, and with that being the goal and the focus that obscures, I think, the specific needs that you know, debaters from different experiences, that have different position in the world, have different educational needs” (Duane Hartman, group interview, p. 7). This is the view of an African American coach and former debater. I think he gets at a crucial issue for anyone interested in the failure of most schools to educate African American students, especially but not only poor ones. We believe, and seem to want to believe, that the same education we provide successfully for middle-class white children is appropriate for children of color. In this perspective, status-quo schooling is neutral; it is a level playing field on which all should be able to compete. [end page 290] Having to attend to any differences of race or culture must mean that the different are less able. They should be able to do just as well as the white children; we should not have to provide extra services or different services. Therefore, we tend not to want to identify cultural or racial difference: we want to ignore it in favor of a colorblind approach. Another participant explained, “One of the popular responses on a high school level to race-based arguments is, you know, colorblindness. ‘It’s when you talk about race that gives it power.’ And, it’s sorta like, to not discuss race is a privilege” (Andre Rubens, group interview II, p. 4).

There is a specific way that people use colorblindness to argue something along the lines of “Black debaters can do just as well as white debaters. If they choose not to, that’s on them.” This viewpoint avoids some areas that some people would just rather not talk about. A parallel is a hiring question that asks teacher job applicants what they know about teaching African American children. In my 10 years of school hiring experience, a majority of respondents will say something like, “I don’t see color when I look at children. I teach them all the same.” What this perspective misses is that there may be something race-related about schooling as it is usually practiced in the 21st century USA and also that there may be something related to race, ethnicity, and culture in how children learn best. I would argue that that has nothing to do with biology or one’s color but everything to do with the historical, cultural, and social locations of African Americans in the U.S.—not only the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow, and continuing and well-documented structural and institutional racism, but also with the rich and varied African American cultures continued and created in the United States. [end page 291]

But as we saw in Chapter 1, an ideology of liberal integrationism counsels us to reject the idea that race matters. Remember Peller’s claim that “Integrationists are committed to the view that race makes no real difference between people, except as unfortunate historical vestiges of irrational discrimination” (p. 130). For integrationists, it behooves us to avoid talk about distinctions surrounding race, and to insist on neutrality and colorblindness. I believe that this is one of the roots of the resistance to performance debate. Indeed, I think this ideology requires that debaters of color “prove” themselves in a traditional debate style. I have not heard it stated as such specifically, so I’m extrapolating so that we can notice the enthymemes:

1. Policy debate is a race-neutral and colorblind activity that has a long and stellar history of producing excellence in academic debate skills in a variety of mostly white male people who go on to important positions in government, the corporate world, and the public sector.

2. There is a standard of excellence in the policy debate world in which speed-reading, spread, a technocratic mindset, and a Eurocentric epistemology are normative. This standard and these norms produce excellent thinkers and debaters. There are content standards for the resolutions that ensure that debaters are debating about worthwhile topics—big issues, foreign affairs, policy wonk stuff. That the USFG is the actor legitimates the endeavor with a sense of importance.

3. We should want to keep the activity in the form and content that is worthwhile and that produces excellence. This is a standard to which all should aspire. The style is part of the activity and inseparable from the excellence achieved. [end page 292]

4. People of color, white women, and other students who are in some way not the debate norm all have an equal place at the debate table. There is no reason for them not to join in the activity as it exists. They can achieve excellence the same as any other [white, male] debater.

5. The fact that statistically, non-white, non-male students do not join debate is attributable to lack of interest. The fact that non-white, non-male students do not achieve success, for the most part, in the debate world, is attributable to lack of effort, or perhaps lack of talent.

6. Because we secretly worry that the lack of joining is due to the lack of success that is due to a deficiency of some sort on the students’ part, we white people need to prove that Black students can make it in the traditional debate world, as is. We do so by insisting that they debate the way the white-normed debate world does, by portraying that world as race-neutral and colorblind.

That’s the argument. Where does it fall apart? If certain givens are seen to be illusory, then the argument does not make sense. So if the debate world is not as described, then perhaps non-white, non-male, non-privileged debaters might benefit from a different debate world or space or norms than the prevalent ones. If debaters are not all the same, if there are cultural differences in communication styles, learning styles, speaking styles, performance styles, epistemology, etc., springing from differences in cultural styles often related to race/ethnicity or gender, then the world normed to the white, male cultural styles would indeed exclude others. [end page 293]

Instead of attempting to prove that Black debaters can debate just as well in traditional styles, we might want to instead take a different stance. Acknowledging different communication styles, historical circumstances, and culture is crucial, Hill says:

Debate...is grounded in Western ideology and frowns upon the African American communication style.... African Americans see the activity as reflecting the opposite of what they believe in. And it becomes difficult for African American competitors to stay in the activity when they must suppress or give up their cultural beliefs in order to be successful.....African Americans are unique. They are unique because of the set of circumstances they have experienced since coming to America. African American culture is tied together with the strings of cultural experience. If that experience is denied, ignored, or devalued, then the culture itself is denied, ignored, or devalued. (Hill, 1997, p. 230)

Perhaps instead of wondering why we should pay attention to the differences and circumstances that Hill points out, we should wonder why we choose not to. Research into multicultural education by scholars including Janice Hale and Gloria Ladson-Billings has been available for many years, and yet it still seems regarded as somewhat fringe by many white educators—including, for a long time, myself.

And yet, choosing not to think about these distinctive characteristics means choosing not to activate agency and empowerment for minority debaters, according to Duane Hartman:

You know, traditional debate...[I think] is for a particular person with particular experiences. ... our form of debate is activates, you know, a notion of one’s own agency and power that traditional debate I don’t think does (Hartman, group interview, p. 9).

Therefore I am arguing here in support of a culturally- and racially-inflected approach to debate that addresses the needs of students in particular historical and social locations. Performance debate provides a very specific example of how such an approach can be achieved, and it has succeeded spectacularly for many students who otherwise might never have had their agency activated in such a way. Investigating the implications of this approach and its success for schooling would be a fascinating and necessary task.

\* Hill = Hill, S. (1997). African American students’ motivation to participate in intercollegiate debate. The Southern Journal of Forensices, 2, 202–235.

### 2AC — Switching Sides Bad DA

#### Switching Sides Bad DA — defending “both sides” of the topic makes students complicit with dehumanizing violence. Their interpretation creates indifference, not engagement.

Spanos 13 — William V. Spanos, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Binghamton, interviewed by Christopher Spurlock, 2013 (“William V. Spanos: An Interested Debate Inquiry,” *kdebate*, Volume 1, Issue 1, Available Online at http://kdebate.com/spanos.html, Accessed 07-09-2014)

CS: When we had our discussion in Binghamton, you asked me if teams were ever marginalized or excluded for reading arguments based on your work. Some have argued that this move is most frequently enacted during debates with an argument aptly referred to as "framework" where one team will define and delimit their ideal 'world picture' of a carefully crafted resolution and then explain why the opposing teams argument have violated the parameters of this 'frame.' In earlier comments on debate you had criticized the disinterested nature of the activity and its participants - the detached model of debate where anything goes so long as you "score points" and detach yourself from the real (human) weight of these issues. How might debaters approach debate or relate to our resolutions in a more interested sense?

WVS: The reason I asked you that question is because I've always thought that the debate system is a rigged process, by which I mean, in your terms, it's framed to exclude anything that the frame can't contain and domesticate. To frame also means to "prearrange" so that a particular outcome is assured," which also means the what's outside of the frame doesn't stand a chance: it is "framed" from the beginning. It was, above all, the great neo-Marxist Louis Althusser's analysis of the "problematic" - the perspective or frame of reference fundamental to knowledge production in democratic-capitalist societies -- that enabled me to see what the so called distinterestness of empirical inquiry is blind to or, more accurately willfully represses in its Panglossian pursuit of the truth.

Althusser's analysis of the "problematic" is too complicated to be explained in a few words. (Anyone interested will find his extended explanation in his introduction --"From Capital\* to Marx's Philosophy" -- to his and Etienne Balibar's book \*Reading Capital\*. It will suffice here to say that we in the modern West have been \*inscribed\* by our culture --"ideological state apparatuses (educational institutions, media, and so on)-- by a system of knowledge production that goes by the name of "disinterested inquiry," but in reality the "truth" at which it arrives is a construct, a fiction, and thus ideological. And this is precisely because, in distancing itself from earthly being --the transience of time --this system of knowledge production privileges the panoptic eye in the pursuit of knowledge. This is what Althusser means by the "problematic": a frame that allows the perceiver to see only what it wants to see. Everything that is outside the frame doesn't exist to the perceiver. He /she is blind to it. It's nothing or, at the site of humanity, it's nobody. Put alternatively, the problematic -- this frame, as the very word itself suggests, \*spatializes\* or \*reifies\* time -- reduces what is a living, problematic force and not a thing into a picture or thing so that it can be comprehended (taken hold of, managed), appropriated, administered, and exploited by the disinterested inquirer.

All that I've just said should suggest what I meant when, long ago, in response to someone in the debate world who seemed puzzled by the strong reservations I expressed on being informed that the debate community in the U.S. was appropriating my work on Heidegger, higher education, and American imperialism. I said then – and I repeat here to you – that the traditional form of the debate, that is, the hegemonic frame that rigidly determines its protocols—is unworldly in an ideological way. It willfully separates the debaters from the world as it actually is—by which I mean as it has been produced by the dominant democratic I capitalist culture—and it displaces them to a free-floating zone, a no place, as it were, where all things, nor matter how different the authority they command in the real world, are equal. But in \*this\* real world produced by the combination of Protestant Christianity and democratic capitalism things – and therefore their value – are never equal. They are framed into a system of binaries—Identity/ difference, Civilization/barbarism I Men/woman, Whites/blacks, Sedentary/ nomadic, Occidental/ oriental, Chosen I preterit (passed over), Self-reliance I dependent (communal), Democracy I communism, Protestant Christian I Muslim, and so on — in which the first term is not only privileged over the second term, but, in thus being privileged, is also empowered to demonize the second. Insofar as the debate world frames argument as if every position has equal authority (the debater can take either side) it obscures and eventually effaces awareness of the degrading imbalance of power in the real world and the terrible injustices it perpetrates. Thus framed, debate gives the false impression that it is a truly democratic institution, whereas in reality it is complicitous with the dehumanized and dehumanizing system of power that produced it. It is no accident, in my mind, that this fraudulent form of debate goes back to the founding of the U.S. as a capitalist republic and that it has produced what I call the "political class" to indicate not only the basic sameness between the Democratic and Republican parties but also its fundamental indifference to the plight of those who don't count in a system where what counts is determined by those who are the heirs of this quantitative system of binaries.

### 2AC — Critique of Procedural Fairness

#### No “procedural fairness” impact. Abstract rules about predictability and limits reflect power disparities, not objective judgment. Our case critiques this “objective perspective.”

Delgado 92 — Richard Delgado, Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law at the University of Colorado, holds a J.D. from the University of California-Berkeley, 1992 (“Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power,” *Cornell Law Review* (77 Cornell L. Rev. 813), May, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

II What the Subjective-Objective Debate Shows — and Conceals

Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26

How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the stronger party – the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date – that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies.

What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more [\*818] likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols – by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytelling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives. n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37

It is no surprise, then, that judgment under an "objective" (or reasonable person) standard generally will favor the stronger party. This, however, is not always the case: Rules that too predictably and reliably favored the strong would be declared unprincipled. n38 The stronger actor must be able to see his favorite principles as fair and [\*819] just – ones that a reasonable society would rely upon in contested situations. n39 He must be able to depict the current standards as integral to justice, freedom, fairness, and administrability – to everything short of the American Way itself (and maybe even that, since societies that regulate these relationships more closely are paternalistic, and verge on (shhh!) socialism). n40

## Negative Materials

### 1NC — Topicality (Not Framework) [Stem]

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground. It was *negotiated* and *announced in advance*, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments.

#### This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the *topic* should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### The affirmative violates this interpretation because they do not advocate that the United States federal government substantially increase *its* economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

### Definition — USFG

#### “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government. The affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.

OECD 87 — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987 (“United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179)

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

### Definition — Its

#### “Its” implies ownership. Engagement with the PRC *by the USFG* must be increased.

Gaertner-Johnston 6 — Lynn Gaertner-Johnston, founder of Syntax Training—a company that provides business writing training and consulting, holds a Master’s Degree in Communication from the University of Notre Dame, 2006 (“Its? It's? Or Its'?,” *Business Writing*—a blog, May 30th, Available Online at http://www.businesswritingblog.com/business\_writing/2006/05/its\_its\_or\_its\_.html, Accessed 07-04-2014)

A friend of mine asked me to write about how to choose the correct form of its, and I am happy to comply. Those three little letters cause a lot of confusion, but once you master a couple of basic rules, the choice becomes simple. Here goes:

Its' is never correct. Your grammar and spellchecker should flag it for you. Always change it to one of the forms below.

It's is the contraction (abbreviated form) of "it is" and "it has." It's has no other meanings--only "it is" and "it has."

Its is the form to use in all other instances when you want a form of i-t-s but you are not sure which one. Its is a possessive form; that is, it shows ownership the same way Javier's or Santosh's does.

Example: The radio station has lost its license.

The tricky part of the its question is this: If we write "Javier's license" with an apostrophe, why do we write "its license" without an apostrophe?

Here is the explanation: Its is like hers, his, ours, theirs, and yours. These are all pronouns. Possessive pronouns do not have apostrophes. That is because their spelling already indicates a possessive. For example, the possessive form of she is hers. The possessive form of we is ours. Because we change the spelling, there is no need to add an apostrophe to show possession. Its follows that pattern.

### Definition — Engagement

#### Economic and/or diplomatic engagement means an attempt to influence the target state through the establishment and enhancement of contacts across multiple issue-areas.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

\* Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

\* Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

\* Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

\* Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

\* Arms transfers

\* Military aid and cooperation

\* Military exchange and training programs

\* Confidence and security-building measures

\* Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

\* Trade agreements and promotion

\* Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

\* Cultural treaties

\* Inauguration of travel and tourism links

\* Sport, artistic and academic exchanges

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Engagement means the use of the promise of rewards to influence a rising power’s behavior. The goal must be to convert a revolutionary state into a status quo power.

Schweller 99 — Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University, former John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Managing The Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 14)

Engagement

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order.

The most common form of engagement is the policy of appeasement, which attempts to settle international quarrels “by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous.”67 Typically, this process requires adjustments in territory and “spheres of influence” and the reallocation of global responsibilities and other sources of prestige commensurate with the growth in power of the rising state.

Engagement is more than appeasement, however. It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice, engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior.

The primary objective of an engagement policy is to minimize conflict and avoid war without compromising the integrity of the existing international order. In essence, the established powers seek to restore system equilibrium by adjusting the international hierarchy of prestige and the division of territory in accordance with the new global balance of power, while at the same time maintaining the formal institutional arrangements and informal rules of the system, that is, its governance structures.68 The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system.

#### Engagement must be rewards-based and status quo transforming. Topical plans need to adopt positive incentives aimed at transforming China’s behavior.

Roberts 4 — Liam Roberts, M.A. Candidate in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, holds a B.A. from Concordia University, 2004 (“Engagement Theory and Target Identity: An Analysis of North Korean Responses to Contemporary Inter-Korean Engagement,” Thesis Submitted in Partial Completion of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, August, Available Online at https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/id/56483/ubc\_2004-0612.pdf, Accessed 09-12-2013, p. 13-14)

Overall

Mindful of the possibilities for misinterpretation between source and target as to which strategy is being pursued, we can distinguish between the theoretical rationale for engagement, deterrence, and compellence by the following definitions:

Figure 1.1: Methods and Objectives in Managing Dissatisfied States [Figure converted to text]

Logic — Method — Objective

Engagement — Rewards-based — Status-quo transforming

Deterrence — Threats-based — Status-quo preserving

Compellence — Threats-based — Status-quo transforming

Engagement, then, is a rewards-based initiative that offers the target gains for cooperative action, and nothing for the status quo. The target enjoys a relatively high degree of space in determining its own participation rate with the source without risking losses. Deterrence works conversely: it is a threat-based initiative that offers the target losses for challenging action, and nothing for maintaining the status quo. The target is relatively constrained by fear of incurring further losses, but neither is it necessarily motivated to alter the status quo. Compellence is more extreme, as a threat-based initiative that demands the target pursue a specific alteration of the status quo, but it may motivate the target to confront the source, and thus may generate tension and raise the odds of conflict.

In the above table, I have not alluded to a link between a rewards-based method and a status quo preserving objective, as we should proceed with an understanding of engagement as a change-oriented strategy. If a dissatisfied state was driven to disturb the status quo in either limited or revolutionary ways, and a source state sought to mete out rewards to encourage a status quo preserving objective, this would not be engagement, but rather "appeasement" — the delivery of gains [end page 13] has no sunset clause, nor any timetable for reciprocal expectations of any kind, excepting that the target abide by general norms of international behaviour. Appeasement, then, is much costlier than engagement, as only the latter is driven by the endgame of inculcating either specific or broad changes in the target. A variety of engagement sub-streams, as described above, will also vary in terms of their cost, contingent on their applicability to specific targets. In none of these sub-streams, however, do we see appeasement's key flaw: buying targets out without any objective of socialization or status-quo change, and no mechanism to advance long-term compliance.

#### In the context of U.S. foreign policy toward China, engagement means any strategy *other than isolationism*.

Feaver 6 — Peter D. Feaver, Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University, served as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2006 (“The Clinton Administration’s China Engagement Policy in Perspective,” Paper Presented at the Conference on War and Peace at Duke University, Available Online at <https://web.duke.edu/pass/pdf/warpeaceconf/p-feaver.pdf>, Accessed 06-22-2016, p. 8-9)

4. The Debate Over Constructive Engagement Misstates the Alternatives

The Clinton Administration frames the debate as a choice between constructive engagement and containment. This is sloppy analysis but shrewd rhetoric. Sloppy analysis because, in fact, containment is not the opposite of engagement. The opposite of engagement is isolationism. Isolationism can either be generalized, as was the case for the first hundred years of the American Republic (at least vis-a-vis Europe) or specific, as was the case with US-Albanian relations during the Cold War. Framing the issue this way, however, is shrewd rhetoric because virtually no one supports isolationism. The Clinton Administration says that if you do not want isolationism, you must therefore support our policy.

This of course, misstates the area of real debate. There is a widespread consensus that the United States needs to engage China. The true debate is over how to engage.

Under the rubric of constructive engagement, there are four basic options depending on the degree to which the interests of the players overlap: (1) direct confrontation/rollback, where one country seeks to diminish the position of the other (viz. U.S. policy on Iraq); (2) containment, where one country seeks to limit the advances of another country’s position (viz. U.S. Cold War [end page 8] policy on the Soviet Union); (3) appeasement, where one country seeks to manage the apparently inevitable advance of the other with concessions on minor points so as to avoid concessions on major issues (viz. British policy on the United States at the turn of the century); or (4) enlargement, where [one] country views the other’s interests as so harmonious that virtually any advance for one is an advance the other (viz. U.S. policy on Great Britain ever since World War I).

Given this more accurate range of choices, it is evident that the Administration has adopted a general posture of constructive engagement (not isolationism) and under that general rubric is pursuing a specific policy of appeasement. Several years ago, I asked the architect of the Administration’s Asia security policy what was the difference between our policy and a policy of appeasement. His response: “Appeasement has a long and distinguished history in diplomatic affairs.”

#### In the context of China, engagement can be differentiated from containment. Topical plans must increase the relative balance of engagement vs. containment.

Ross 99 — Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Engagement in US China Policy,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 180)

America’s response to China’s developing power will depend not only on how Washington balances short-term and long-term interests but also on the strategy it chooses to address its long-term interest in managing Chinese power and to create a favorable strategic environment in East Asia. American policy options are usually portrayed as a choice between “containment” and “engagement,” with containment characterized as coercive policies designed to prevent China from developing and using its growing power to displace American influence in Asia and engagement as strategic adjustment to legitimate Chinese objectives in an effort to establish an East Asian order that is both conducive to US interests and characterized by peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest.1

How the United States resolves the competing pressures between short-term and long-term interests and between long-term coercive and long-term adjustment policies will be a decisive factor in determining the prospects for peace in East Asia and a stable world order in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, however, there will be no clear-cut policy choices. Rather, US policy will inevitably reflect a mix of these competing interests and this mix will evolve over time in response to ongoing evaluation and re-evaluation of Chinese behavior and objectives and to developments in US relationships with other Asian countries and, equally important, in US domestic politics.

#### Engagement is distinct from containment — topical plans must attempt to balance China via cooperative policies, not coercion.

Ross 99 — Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Engagement in US China Policy,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 186-188)

There is a broad American consensus on America’s role in Asia in the twenty- first century and in the need to balance potential Chinese power; but this consensus has not created a consensus on policy toward China. Consistent with a balance of power strategy, there remains a wide array of US policy options for developing the bilateral US-China relationship and for influencing the nature of the regional and global order. It is these choices that have led to the debate over [end page 186] US strategy for dealing with the rise of Chinese power between proponents of containment and proponents of engagement.

These two policy packages are both premised on the assumption that should China become more powerful, it will inevitably challenge US supremacy in Asia, but their policy preferences are premised on diametrically opposed understandings of Chinese intentions. Advocates of containment argue that once China has modernized its military it will use armed force to achieve its territorial ambitions, including reunification of Taiwan with the mainland and control over the Senkaku Islands, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Insofar as China will be a major importer of oil, it will seek to control the sea lanes connecting Chinese ports with the Middle East. These analysts also argue that Chinese leaders have already concluded that the United States will be the most important obstacle to realizing China’s objectives and that escalated US-China conflict is inevitable. In this view, China’s strategic objective is to weaken and ultimately oust American influence from East Asia to achieve its territorial objectives as well as its ultimate strategic objective—regional hegemony.11

Because they believe that Chinese intentions are not reactive, advocates of containment foresee little benefit in trying to reach compromise solutions to conflicts of interest. On the contrary, conciliatory US behavior simply encourages Beijing to encroach on US interests and to pursue its expansionist objectives because it suggests that the United States is neither prepared to inflict a cost on PRC “rogue” behavior nor to resist PRC hegemonic aspirations. Indeed, in this view American conciliatory behavior abets PRC efforts to subjugate smaller powers because it signals to states in the region that Washington is not prepared to challenge Chinese expansionism and that it is content that local powers, such as the Philippines, contend with China without American support.12

This perspective resembles US containment policies of the US-Soviet Cold War period insofar as it advocates a stiff retaliatory response to any PRC diplomatic, economic, and military initiative that challenges US interests and because it opposes PRC participation in international economic and security regimes until Beijing evidences its intent and its ability to “follow the rules.” Proponents of containment criticize Washington for its inadequate response to China’s military modernization program, its arms sales to the Third World, and its naval activities in disputed waters in the South China Sea. They view US-China economic ties as providing Beijing with the technological know-how and financial resources to eventually challenge US economic and strategic interests.13

Engagement is the other package of policy options consistent with a strategic policy of balancing PRC power. It agrees that the United States must not and will not allow China to establish a unipolar East Asia, but it also argues that within a balance of power system, policy choices can determine the levels of tension and violence that characterize conflicts of interest between the great powers. Consistent with the concept of engagement developed in Randall Schweller’s chapter, American proponents of engagement argue that Chinese [end page 187] leaders have yet to formulate an immutable view of long-term US-China relations and that American policy can influence China’s willingness to adopt cooperative policies. Washington should develop policy toward China that will balance growing Chinese power, protect US interests, and minimize the potential for global and regional instability and bilateral tension. As one advocate of engagement explained, the problem with the containment strategy is that “If you treat China as enemy, then you will have an enemy.”14 Engagement strategy, on the other hand, is premised on the possibility that if the United States treats China as a partner, then it will not become an enemy. Advocates of engagement further argue that the United States, having consolidated its alliance with Japan and its strategic presence in East Asia, Washington can use its strategic superiority to engage China from a position of strength, thus maximizing Washington’s ability to encourage China to adopt cooperative policies toward regional order.15

#### In the context of China, engagement means bilateral accommodation, societal entanglement, and multilateral accommodation over economic and security issues.

Ross 99 — Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Engagement in US China Policy,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 188-189)

Advocates of engagement generally promote three variants of the engagement strategy. The first is a bilateral approach. It stresses that how the United States addresses contemporary US-China conflicts of interest will affect the Chinese leadership’s perception of US intentions and thus whether in the long term Beijing will perceive opportunities to cooperate with Washington to develop a stable regional order. On the other hand, mismanagement of PRC perceptions will lead Beijing to view the United States as an implacable adversary requiring adoption of destabilizing militant policies to realize Chinese interests and to weaken US presence in Asia. In this view, prospects for cooperation will be maximized if Washington eschews heavy-handed coercive policies. Engagement calls for negotiated solutions to conflicts of interest that avoid escalated tension and realize immediate American policy objectives. This aspect of policy is consistent with a traditional understanding of appeasement as defined in Chapter 1.16

The second variant of an American engagement strategy stresses a multilateral approach to promoting PRC participation and interest in a stable international order. It is this variant that separates Schweller’s understanding of appeasement from engagement.17 This strategy does not require that the necessary precondition to PRC membership in global institutions is immediate Chinese adherence to the rules as they now exist. In contrast to bilateral appeasement, this approach recognizes that Chinese leadership and a Chinese stake in international institutions and the global order can be a source of international stability and promote peaceful change. It stresses that Chinese entry into multilateral institutions, including the World Trade Organization and various security regimes, must be a negotiated process, so that membership does not require that China sacrifice important interests. It is premised on the understanding that for multilateral institutions to be effective, Beijing must be part of the rule-making process and benefit from the rules. Engagement advocates acknowledge that this process would necessarily be a consensual process in which the United States would not be able to maximize its interests. But they argue that US compromises [end page 188] reflecting Chinese interests are preferable to developing a global order without Chinese participation, one in which China would have an interest in violating its rules and undermining its effectiveness. Adherents to this policy package would agree with US Ambassador to China James Sasser, who argued that as China reveals a willingness to live in a rule-based system of institutions, it “must be allowed to help make the global rules.”18

The third variant of American engagement stresses the importance of long-term cooperative US-China societal and institutional relationships as determinants of Chinese behavior. Engagers argue that rather than isolate China, the United States should promote Chinese societal and political interests in stable US-China relations and in a stable international order. These interests will affect PRC calculations regarding the value of revisionist foreign policies, insofar as conflictual policies would impose costs on Chinese domestic actors and political constituencies. This is the bilateral equivalent to a strategy of multilateral “binding.” It is an “entanglement” strategy insofar as, by enmeshing China in a web of entangling relationships, Chinese leaders may be more inclined to tolerate a sub-optimal international order.

These three approaches toward peaceful management of a rising power — bilateral accommodation, societal entanglement, and multilateral accommodation — can be mutually complementary and reinforcing. Moreover, each has its particular policy expression in both economic and security matters. A comprehensive engagement policy would pursue all three variants in both policy arenas.

### Definition — PRC

#### PRC is the official name of China.

Oxford 16 – Oxford Online Dictionary, “People’s Republic of China”, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/people's-republic-of-china

People's Republic of China

Official name (since 1949) of China.

#### PRC refers to the country of China.

Collins 16 – Collins English Dictionary, “People’s Republic of China”, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/people-s-republic-of-china

a republic in E Asia: the third largest and the most populous country in the world; the oldest continuing civilization (beginning over 2000 years bc); republic established in 1911 after the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty by Sun Yat-sen; People's Republic formed in 1949; the 1980s and 1990s saw economic liberalization but a rejection of political reform; contains vast deserts, steppes, great mountain ranges (Himalayas, Kunlun, Tian Shan, and Nan Shan), a central rugged plateau, and intensively cultivated E plains. Language: Chinese in various dialects, the chief of which is Mandarin. Religion: nonreligious majority; Buddhist and Taoist minorities. Currency: yuan. Capital: Beijing. Pop: 1 349 586 000 (2013 est). Area: 9 560 990 sq km (3 691 502 sq miles)

### Impact — China Policy Literacy

#### Debates between students about U.S. policy toward China are essential to global peace and stability.

McGiffert 15 — Carola McGiffert, President of the 100,000 Strong Foundation (now called the U.S.-China Strong Foundation)—a nonprofit organization that seeks to strengthen US-China relations by investing in a new generation of leaders who have the knowledge and skills to engage with China, former Senior Advisor and Director of the 100,000 Strong Initiative at the U.S. Department of State, former Vice President and Chief of Staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Special Assistant at The White House during the Clinton Administration, holds an M.A. in Chinese Studies and International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2015 (“Preface,” *Strengthening U.S.-China Relations One Student At A Time: Perspectives From Leaders In The Field*, Signature Report of The 100,000 Strong Foundation, Available Online at [http://asiasociety.org/files/[ENG]%20Strengthening-US-China-Relations-One-Student-at-a-Time-Perspectives-From-Leaders-in-the-Field.pdf](http://asiasociety.org/files/%5bENG%5d%20Strengthening-US-China-Relations-One-Student-at-a-Time-Perspectives-From-Leaders-in-the-Field.pdf), Accessed 06-23-2016, p. 8-10)

The US-China relationship stands at a critical juncture. Long marked by competition and contention, today the relationship is being tested in new ways. With China’s growing economic and military strength come new fears about Beijing’s true goals. With the US pivot toward Asia come new Chinese concerns about Washington’s true intentions. “Strategic mistrust”—now a cliché in think-tank circles—remains very much the predominant theme in the US-China narrative.

This is dangerous, not only because mistrust can lead to miscommunication, miscalculation, and even conflict, but also because we need this relationship to work—for America’s own economic and strategic interests as well as to ensure global stability. Every global crisis will require the United States and China to work together toward resolution; every new challenge will necessitate collaboration.

Those crises abound. As I write this, the deadly Ebola virus continues to ravage West Africa; climate change inflicts record droughts and storms on the Western US; Middle East conflicts are exploding; and poor nations keep getting poorer, while developed nations keep getting older. How will the world’s two most powerful nations address these and future challenges? Will we be able to work together decades from now on the many issues we’re sure to face?

How we manage this relationship today will have long-term impact. To ensure a robust relationship, America’s leaders and workforce must be China fluent. Regardless of economic or personal background, regardless of the professional paths we choose, all Americans should understand China. We need a deeper bench of well-trained Americans who are negotiating and cooperating with their Chinese peers. This is a national imperative, one that our two governments have recognized and endorsed. [end page 8]

Our choice is clear: We must invest in our young people to ensure that they—our future leaders—have the skills to guarantee the ongoing success of the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

This report is about charting the future of that critical relationship. These authors are pioneers in their fields. They know that understanding China, as Blackstone CEO Stephen A. Schwarzman has said, “is no longer an elective; it is a requirement.”

To put this effort into context, renowned scholar David Lampton reflects on the productive development of US-China relations and the critical importance of study abroad in fostering that relationship over the past 35 years.

Vice Minister of Education Hao Ping, Former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard Stengel, and representatives Charles Boustany and Rick Larsen all have advocated at the highest levels of the US government for strong US-China educational ties.

Business leaders Stephen A. Schwarzman and Muhtar Kent have secured economic opportunities for this China-fluent generation, enhancing both the present and future prosperity of our two peoples. [end page 9]

Two leaders in global civil society, Josette Sheeran and Mark Tercek, have confronted global issues like sustainable development, malnutrition and hunger, and environmental degradation— issues that won’t be overcome without a united US-China front.

Academic leaders, like university presidents Norman Francis and Jennifer Raab, work to ensure that students of all backgrounds have the opportunity to study in China.

Finally, two of our student ambassadors, Benjamin Brooks and Jarlene Choy, have shared their stories of appreciation for the hard work these leaders have done to broaden their futures.

These authors are part of a growing national movement. Leaders from business, academia, government, and civil society have united around the critical mission of 100,000 Strong. To them, the need for a productive US-China relationship is clear and urgent. We hope this report will serve as a call to action to others to join this movement and prepare our young people to compete, collaborate, and succeed in a world in which China plays a central role.

#### Ordinary citizens need to debate U.S.-China relations. *World peace* and resolutions to *every major issue* depend on it.

Watkins 16 — Tom Watkins, Advisor to Michigan’s Economic Development Corporation, the Chinese Association of Greater Detroit, and the Detroit Chinese Business Association who has traveled, written about, and worked in China for over three decades, former State Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Michigan, holds an Ed.D. in Educational Leadership and Administration from Wayne State University, 2016 (“China/US: Most Important Relationship In The World Today,” *Dome*, March 25th, Available Online at <http://domemagazine.com/tomwatkins/tw032516>, Accessed 06-23-2016)

Rhetoric or reality? As the second decade of the 21st century unfolds, the relationship between the U.S. and China remains the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

REALITY!

What happens in China and the U.S. impacts all humanity. Going forward, all major world issues will intersect at the corner of Washington DC and Beijing. The relationship between our two nations is the foundation for world peace, but we must find ways to rise above our differences and grow together. The thought of our relationship disintegrating is unthinkable.

It is in our respective countries’ self-interest, as well as the interest of the entire world, to ensure the continued understanding and improvement of U.S.-Chinese relations. The more we collectively achieve a deeper level of communication, understanding, and friendship between us—ranging from the average citizen to local, state and provincial leaders, scholars, NGO’s and policymakers in our respective countries and around the globe—the better off we will all be.

At the last U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue meeting in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jingping pointed out that the bilateral relations between our countries have gone through an extraordinary journey since the establishment of diplomatic relations 35 years ago. The Chinese leader reinforced the direction we should be taking saying, “China and the U.S. should stick to the general direction of building a new model of major country relationship which features no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. Both sides should also enhance mutual trust, expand converging interests, and manage and control differences, so as to promote the China-US relations to continuously move forward along the right track.”

I suggest that in the 35 years since normalization of relations between our country and China, we have done a remarkable job building connections between government leader-to-leader, academic, business, economic and more recently, even militarily.

But we need to do much more to educate and enlighten the average U.S. “Joe Six Pack” and China’s “Old Hundred Names” (e,g. “nao bai xing,” an idiomatic Chinese expression referring to ordinary people in China), about each other. The nationalistic urge to blame each other’s country for some perceived slight, economic downfall, or diplomatic or military mistake is right below the surface, ready to be exploited at a moment’s notice. Our leaders must be cognizant of this tendency. As Mao once proclaimed, “Even the smallest spark can start a raging forest fire.” The wrong nationalistic spark, once ignited, may not be retrievable and could set the world aflame.

#### *Despite competing priorities*, debating U.S.-China relations is vital — it’s the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

Jones et al. 13 — David Martin Jones, Associate Professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland (Australia), former Lecturer at the National University of Singapore, holds a Ph.D. in Government from The London School of Economics and Political Science, with Nicholas Khoo, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Otago (New Zealand), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, and M.L.R. Smith, the pen name of Michael Rainsborough, Professor of Strategic Theory at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, University of London (UK), Fellow at the Royal Society of the Arts, former Senior Lecturer in the Department of History and International Affairs at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, former Consultant and Principal Lecturer at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), holds a Ph.D. from King’s College, University of London, 2013 (“Rocky rise: US-China relations in the post-Cold War era,” *Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1781004625, p. 12)

In any work of political analysis, the scholar faces many competing topics that vie for attention. There is, therefore, a need to select and then assess what is critical as opposed to important; and what is important as opposed to what is tangential. The primary purpose of this chapter is to identify and evaluate the trajectory of Sino-US relations since the watershed year of 1989, from the George H.W. Bush administration through to the Obama administration.

It is the contention of this book that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Sino-American relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship in their respective foreign policies, and arguably the most important bilateral relationship in world politics. Thus, all the post-Cold War era US Presidents from George H.W. Bush through to Obama have emphasized the centrality of Sino-US relations as a long-term issue in US foreign policy, even if immediate exigencies may, at times, have compelled a focus on other issues.1 For their part, Chinese leaders have consistently viewed the relationship with the US as the single most important in their long-term considerations.2

### Impact — Deliberation Skills

#### Topicality facilitates a process of successive debates that develops important skills and fosters appreciation for multiple perspectives. Abandoning the topic forecloses the educational and democratic benefits of debate.

Lundberg 10 — Christian O. Lundberg, Associate Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, 2010 (“The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,” *Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century*, Edited by Allan D. Louden, Published by the International Debate Education Association, ISBN 9781617700293, p. 299)

In response to the first critique, which ultimately reduces to the claims that debate overdetermines democratic deliberation and that it inculcates an unhealthy antagonism, a number of scholars have extended the old maxim that dissent is critical to democracy in arguing that debate is a critical tool for civic deliberation (Brookfield and Preskill 1999; Levinson 2003). Gill Nichols (2000, 132) argues that a commitment to debate and dissent as a core component of democracy is especially critical in the face of the complexity of modern governance, rapid technological change, and an increasing need to deal with the nexus of science and public policy. The benefits of in-class debate espoused by Stephen Brookfield, Meira Levinson, and Nichols stem from the idea that debate inculcates skills for creative and open-minded discussion of disputes in the context of democratic deliberation: on their collective accounting, debate does not close down discussion by reducing issues to a simple pro/con binary, nor does it promote antagonism at the expense of cooperative discussion. Rather, properly cultivated, debate is a tool for managing democratic conflicts that foregrounds significant points of dispute, and then invites interlocutors to think about them together creatively in the context of successive strategic iterations, [end page 304] moments of evaluation, and reiterations of arguments in the context of a structured public discussion.

Goodwin’s study of in-class debate practice confirms these intuitions. Goodwin’s study revealed that debate produces an intense personal connection to class materials while simultaneously making students more open to differing viewpoints. Goodwin’s conclusion is worth quoting at length here:

Traditional teaching techniques like textbooks, lectures, and tests with right answers insulate students from the open questions and competing answers that so often drive our own interest in our subjects. Debates do not, and in fact invite students to consider a range of alternative views on a subject, encountering the course content broadly, deeply and personally. Students’ comments about the value of disagreement also offer an interesting perspective on the nature of the thinking skills we want to foster. The previous research . . . largely focused on the way debate can help students better master the principles of correct reasoning. Although some students did echo this finding, many more emphasized the importance of debate in helping them to recognize and deal with a diversity of viewpoints. (Goodwin 2003, 158)

The results of this research create significant questions about the conclusion that debate engenders reductive thinking and an antagonism that is unhealthy to democracy. In terms of the criticism that debate is reductive, the implication of Goodwin’s study is that debate creates a broader appreciation for multiple perspectives on an issue than the predominant forms of classroom instruction. This conclusion is especially powerful when one considers debate as more than a discrete singular performance, but as a whole process of inventing, discussing, employing, and reformulating arguments in the context of an audience of comparatively objective evaluators. In the process of researching, strategizing, debating, reframing stances, and switching sides on a question, students are provided with both a framework for thinking about a problem and creative solutions to it from a number of angles. Thus, while from a very narrow perspective one might claim debate practices reduce all questions to a “pro” and a “con,” the cumulative effects of the pedagogical process of preparing for, performing, and evaluating a debate provide the widest possible exposure to the varied positions that a student might take on an issue. Perhaps more significantly, in-class debate provides a competitive incentive for finding as many innovative and unique approaches to a problem as possible, and for translating them into publically useful positions.

#### Even if the content of the affirmative is valuable, the process they endorse is not. Debating the topic challenges students to articulate and defend positions grounded in the best evidence for and against the proposition. Knowledge of the topic increases depth of inquiry and quality of evaluation.

Lundberg 10 — Christian O. Lundberg, Associate Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, 2010 (“The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,” *Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century*, Edited by Allan D. Louden, Published by the International Debate Education Association, ISBN 9781617700293, p. 299)

Part of the benefit of debate in this regard is that more than simply fostering student engagement with the curricula by incentivizing mastery of the material and engendering a cooperative learning environment, debate practices also facilitate the application of course material to students’ everyday lives (Kennedy 2007, 183; Martens 2005, 4). Debate practice is uniquely effective in fostering application because it demands that a student have a relatively comprehensive grasp of a subject area, but, more important, that they articulate a position relative to the issues in the debate, and evaluate the competing claims that they might make in relation to the strength of the evidence that supports them (Schuster and Meany 2005). Thus, debate practices foster not only engagement with an issue but also an evaluation of a student’s position relative to an issue in the light of the best arguments for and against a proposition. Debate offers privileged access not only to content mastery, or even opinion formation, but what is more important is that it bridges the gap between the theoretical knowledge inculcated in the classroom and the specific personal stands that one might take both toward a specific resolution and, more broadly, toward the critical argumentative connections that a given resolution for debate accesses. Debate then has the potential to create a depth of inquiry and evaluation relative to the classroom curriculum that is unparalleled both in terms of knowledge of a subject area, and perhaps more significantly, in terms of a set of owned investments relative to the propositions at hand.

#### There’s nothing violent or oppressive about the deliberation we defend.

Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” *Criticism*, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)

Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that [End Page 285] is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police.

Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off:

Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand.

Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak [End Page 286] about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

### Impact — Manageable Limits

#### A limited topic facilitates more productive debates. The goal of debate should be to encourage in-depth clash over a well-understood subject area between well-prepared opponents. This is only possible when the topic is limited. Overly broad topics result in unfulfilling exchanges of sound bites and zingers instead of meaningful and enlightening engagement.

Gutting 13 — Gary Gutting, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, holds a Ph.D. from St. Louis University, 2013 (“A Great Debate,” *The Stone*—a *New York Times* blog featuring writing by contemporary philosophers curated by Simon Critchley, February 19th, Available Online at <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/>, Accessed 09-15-2015)

This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”

Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).

There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.

Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.

Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?

A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.

Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.

Here’s one suggestion for an effective exchange. The debate would consist of a series of four half-hour televised sessions, carried out on successive days. In the first session, the Republican, say, presents a pre-written case for a particular position (say that tax-cuts are better for the economy than stimulus spending). The Democrat, who will have read the Republican’s presentation beforehand, presents a 15-minute point-by-point response. In the second session, the Republican asks the Democrat a series of questions (no more than one minute per question and three minutes per response) on the debate topic. In the third session, the Democrat questions the Republican. In the fourth session, each side has 15 minutes to present a final argument. This, of course, is just one idea. I welcome readers’ suggestions for refinements or alternatives.

Such debates will not end our political disagreements, but they will set much higher standards of discussion, requiring fuller explanations of positions and even modifications to make them more defensible. It’s unlikely that either side would ever simply give up its view, but, politically, they would have to react to a strong public consensus if they had not made a respectable case. Further, the quasi-official status of the participants, as representatives chosen by their parties, would make the parties’ politicians answerable to points the representatives have made. If Congressman X says at a press conference, “Lower rates have always produced higher tax revenues,” reporters might point out the party’s representative had to retreat to a more nuanced position. Such nuance might open the path to fruitful compromise.

The only major obstacle to implementing this proposal would be getting the parties to participate. Here, I suggest, shame would be a prime motivator. Given strong popular support for such debates, it’s hard to see how the parties could answer the charge that they are shying away because they don’t have confidence in their ability to make a convincing case.

Of course, many people will not have the time, interest, or the ability to follow debates of this sort. But those who do — including the leading commentators and opinion-makers — will be among the most concerned and articulate, and their views will have a significant effect on the terms and tone of the general discussion.

Facts and reasoning will never settle political issues. All of us have fundamental commitments that are impervious to argument. If an argument seems to refute them, we take this as a refutation of the argument. And, of course, many of us are too ignorant, self-interested or prejudiced on certain issues to be moved by rational considerations. But rationality almost always has some role in our decisions, and more rationality in our political discussion will at a minimum help many to better understand what is at stake in our disputes and why their opponents think as they do.

#### Exemptions from the negotiated and announced topic make it impossible to read enough and learn enough about the content of the 1AC to thoroughly prepare for a productive debate. This mirrors academia’s closed systems of self-referential scholarship and results in boring debates.

Grossberg 15 — Lawrence Grossberg, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor of Media Studies and Cultural Studies, Adjunct Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, and Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Senior Editor of *Cultural Studies*, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Research from the University of Illinois, 2015 (“The Fate of Knowledge,” *We All Want To Change The World. The Paradox of the US Left: A Polemic*, Published by Lawrence & Wishart, ISBN 9781910448496, p. 62-64)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced.

This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary [end page 62] efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One [end page 63] good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

Finally, everything is driven by highly exaggerated claims of originality (new discoveries, new theories, new solutions derived from new sources—and increasingly, new disciplines) that justify the extraordinary explosion of essays, journals and books. As much as it saddens me to say this, an ever-expanding body of work is full of exaggerated and self-aggrandizing claims of originality and import. The result is that a great deal of what is published is, to put it plainly, crap—certainly not worth reading —not because it is theoretical, or political, or contemporary, but because it appears to be written in a vacuum or at best, a rather boring conversation among a small group of people who share the same assumptions and habits of thought.10 Most of what is being said simply repeats what has been already said in different terms, often ignoring a history of discussions and debates (over certain positions, assumptions, practices, logics, etc.), so that one increasingly feels like intellectual history is repeating itself over and over.

#### An unlimited topic undermines students’ intrinsic motivation to gain more knowledge. Preserving a predictable and manageable preparation burden is a prerequisite to motivated learning. To be clear: our argument is not that what the affirmative discussed isn’t worth learning. It’s that students won’t be motivated to learn *anything* if the research burden is unreasonable.

Paras and Bizzocchi 5 — Brad Paras, Game Developer and Research Assistant at Simon Fraser University, and Jim Bizzocchi, Associate Professor in the School of Interactive Arts and Technology at Simon Fraser University, holds an M.Sc. in Comparative Media Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005 (“Game, Motivation, and Effective Learning: An Integrated Model for Educational Game Design,” Proceedings of DiGRA—the Digital Games Research Association, Available Online at <http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-library/06276.18065.pdf>, Accessed 10-29-2015, p. 1-2)

To motivate is to “provide with an incentive”. To motivate someone to learn is to provide them with an incentive to engage in the act of gaining knowledge. In traditional instructional design practice, motivation is often considered as a preliminary step in the instructional process [2]. [end page 1] Intrinsic motivation in learning, however, focuses on the development of motivation throughout the entire instructional process. Though traditional instructional design practice focuses on a less integrated approach, developing life-long learners who are intrinsically motivated, display intellectual curiosity, find learning enjoyable, and continue seeking knowledge after their formal instruction has ended has always been a major goal of education [17].

Looking at the ‘effort’ expelled during the learning process will help determine whether learners are motivated. However, for ‘effort’ to even occur, there are two necessary prerequisites required: (1) the person must value the task and (2) the person must believe he or she can succeed at the task. In any given instructional situation, the learning task needs to be presented in a way that is engaging and meaningful to the student, and in a way that promotes positive expectations for the successful achievement of learning objectives [17]. To help understand motivation in instruction we can look at the ARCS Model of Motivational Design as developed by John M. Keller of Florida State University [9]. The ARCS Model identifies four essential strategy components for motivating instruction:

[A]ttention strategies for arousing and sustaining curiosity and interest.

- Learners are more motivated when the instructional design generates curiosity and interest about the content or learning context.

[R]elevance strategies that link to learners' needs, interests, and motives.

- Learners are more motivated when goals are clearly defined and align with learners’ interests.

[C]onfidence strategies that help students develop a positive expectation for successful achievement.

- Learners are more motivated when challenge is balanced in such a way that the learning process is neither too easy as to bore the leaner, or too difficult such that success seems impossible.

[S]atisfaction strategies that provide extrinsic and intrinsic reinforcement for effort.

- Learners are more motivated when there are rewards for correctly executed actions.

### Impact — Procedural Fairness

#### Procedural fairness is most important — it establishes expectations for preparation and facilitates respectful and productive dialogue between well-prepared opponents. Topicality-not-framework is a reasonable procedural norm.

Massaro 89 — Toni M. Massaro, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, 1989 (“Legal Storytelling: Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,” *Michigan Law Review* (87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099), August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

B. The Rule-of-Law Model as Villain

Most writers who argue for more empathy in the law concede that law must resort to some conventions and abstract principles. That is, they do not claim that legal rules are, as rules, intrinsically sinister. Rather, they argue that we should design our legal categories and procedures in a way that encourages the decisionmakers to consider individual persons and concrete situations. Generalities, abstractions, and formalities should not dominate the process. The law should be flexible enough to take emotion into account, and to respond openly to the various "stories" of the people it controls. We should, as I have said, move toward "minimalist" law.

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. n52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. n53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.

My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. n54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.

Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. n55

As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, n56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.

Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. n57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. n58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.

A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity – “law for law's sake" – because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. n59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. n60

#### Fairness is a “real world” impact because prep time isn’t unlimited. The expectation that we prepare case-specific strategies against every non-topical affirmative requires students to compromise other aspects of their lives.

Harris 13 — Scott Harris, Associate Specialist and Debate Coach at the University of Kansas, holds a Ph.D. in Communication from Northwestern University, 2013 (“This Ballot,” Ballot from the Final Round of the 2013 National Debate Tournament, Posted on the *Global Debate* blog, April 6th, Available Online at http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/scott-harris-writes-long-ballot-for-ndt.html, Accessed 08-31-2013)

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

### Impact — Policy Relevance

#### The affirmative’s refusal to endorse a topical policy is a failure of intellectual chutzpah. It takes *guts* to express a clear policy position on an issue as important to the world as U.S. foreign policy toward China because it requires scholars to expose their ideas to criticism. Topic-centered debates create a culture of intellectual bravery rather than one of perpetual intellectual anonymity.

Rothschild 15 — Amanda J. Rothschild, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Research Fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, Co-Chair of the Women in International Politics and Security Working Group, holds a B.A. in Political Science from Boston College, 2015 (“Policy Relevant Scholarship: What’s Chutzpah Got To Do With It?,” *War On The Rocks*—a scholarly blog that covers foreign policy and national security issues through a realist lens, July 6th, Available Online at <http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/policy-relevant-scholarship-whats-chutzpah-got-to-do-with-it/>, Accessed 07-12-2016)

One important component of policy relevance has thus far received little attention in the Schoolhouse series here at War on the Rocks: chutzpah. It often requires courage for a scholar to take a position on an important policy issue and to argue for it publicly, whether in an op-ed, on television, online, or through other mediums. You expose yourself to a new and enlarged audience for critique. You may be labeled an activist, which is a dirty word in academia. You may become associated with a certain political party or position regardless of your actual political beliefs. You may provoke disdain from your colleagues, who, in addition to disagreeing with your argument, might disagree with your choice to be engaged in policy debates in the first place. You could even alienate organizations that might have funded your research. The more controversial the topic, the more likely these consequences. In short, being policy relevant takes guts.

Examples of gutsy policy relevant writings from the international relations and security fields are numerous: Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations; Barry Posen’s Restraint; Robert Kagan’s The World America Made; Kenneth Pollack’s The Threatening Storm; Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and other writings on decline; several works by Stephen Van Evera from the War on Terror to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the respective work of Kenneth Waltz, Alan Kuperman, Frank Gavin, Nick Miller, and Or Rabinowitz on the Iranian nuclear program; and the advertisement signed by thirty-three senior security scholars against the war in Iraq in the New York Times on September 26, 2002. These intellectuals all took a highly public position on important subjects, and many of them faced intense and at times highly personal criticism in the wake of their publications and commentary. They argued in academic publications, on the radio, in America’s magazines, and in think tank forums. One need not agree with their positions to acknowledge that they adopted a clear and unambiguous stance on an issue, and that they were forced to weather the subsequent reaction.

This is policy relevance in one of its most effective forms. You can’t miss it. When you take a public position as these scholars did, no one wonders where you stand. Case in point: Does anyone question Barry Posen’s position on U.S. engagement with the world and American grand strategy? Can we say the same about everyone who claims to do policy relevant research? If we can’t, is that problematic?

It would seem that if you don’t know where someone stands, it is because that person has never taken a stand at all. Indeed, when it comes to policy relevance, where you stand may be more important than where you sit. Standing up requires chutzpah. If you never take a clear position publicly on an important policy issue, you can remain in perpetual intellectual anonymity. No one will know what you think, which means very few will care what you think. You will likely escape the aforementioned consequences of public commentary. Yet your impact and the policy relevance of your research are also likely to be minimal.

All of this is not to say that those who scream the loudest, most frequently, or most predictably are necessarily the most effective or even the most beneficial voices in the public debate. Nuanced, thoughtful commentary is of course much better than provocative writing intended solely to create controversy where perhaps none exists, or to shine the spotlight a little brighter on the author. Some stand up bravely better than others. Commentary that furthers civil debate and discussion is more valuable than commentary that merely boils the blood.

Policy relevance also comes in many forms, as noted recently by Michael Horowitz. Perhaps one of the most admirable forms of policy relevance is public service, which often happens quietly, without fanfare, on sabbaticals or summer breaks. These people contribute gracefully behind closed doors, away from the blogs, microphones, and op-ed pages.

Nevertheless, in international relations and security, we are studying issues with critical stakes for the world. Applying our research to these issues often necessitates entering the public debate and taking a position. As a result, we would be wise to cultivate a culture of intellectual bravery. Yes, all of us, from the first-year graduate student to the tenured professor, should learn to ask big questions, to write on important subjects, and to disseminate our work to the wider world in whichever outlet we feel most comfortable with. Yet we should also recognize that our discipline, the study of politics in various forms, requires those who speak out to take risks, to be bold in contributing to the world around us, to be a little scrappy, and to be intrepid. We have knowledge that can make a difference. Do we have the chutzpah to apply it?

#### By rejecting specific policy ideas in favor of promised outcomes, the aff echoes the magical thinking of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. Debating specific proposals is the only way to confront pressing problems.

Wittes 16 — Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Editor in Chief of Lawfare, Member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, 2016 (“Trump as National Security Threat,” *Lawfare*—a national security blog curated by the Brookings Institution, March 2nd, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-national-security-threat, Accessed 03-02-2016)

Finally, Trump’s entire candidacy is predicated on a weird kind of magical thinking that has no place in serious policy discussion generally but is particularly dangerous in the national security sphere. Trump does not propose policy ideas. He identifies and promises outcomes. We’re going to do a lot of winning. We’re going to smash ISIS. We’re going to have great trade deals. We’re going to be tough. We’re going to bring back jobs. We’re going to build a wall and Mexico is going to pay for it. We’re going to make America great again. He never proposes a modality for achieving any of these things. They're going to happen by force of personality and force of will.

Trump got in trouble this past weekend for retweeting a quotation from Mussolini. But the quotation in question was not the Mussolini line that Trump’s candidacy actually embodies.

My nomination for that dubious honor is the following: “Our program is simple: we wish to govern Italy. They ask us for programs but there are already too many. It is not programs that are wanting for the salvation of Italy but men and will power.”

This is Trump: promising outcomes without programs, promising to do by force of personality and will what a country cannot do through policy or democratic deliberation. It is a lie in all spheres. But in the national security space, it is a particularly pernicious lie. Our tools are too dangerous for cults of personality. Our problems are too hard to wish away with magical thinking. The stakes are too high to permit magic to eclipse persuasive thought and analysis. And the relationship between our tools and tyranny is too intimate to allow demagogues anywhere near the decisions the national security apparatus has to make—or the machineries with which it makes them.

#### In-depth knowledge about the USFG and its policies is empowering. This answers “*historical determinism*” and proves that government is responsive to citizen intervention.

Zelden 8 — Charles L. Zelden, Professor of History at Nova Southeastern University, holds a Ph.D. in History from Rice University, 2008 (“Foreword,” *The Legislative Branch of Federal Government: People, Process, and Politics*, Written by Gary P. Gershman, Published by ABC-CLIO, ISBN 1851097120, p. vii-ix)

Most of us know something about the federal government. At the very least, we can name its three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—and discuss the differences between them. At an early age, we are taught in school about the president of the United States and his official roles and responsibilities; we learn about Congress and the courts and their place in our government. In civics classes, we often get a skeletal picture of how the nation’s government works; we are told that Congress writes the laws, the president executes them, and the Supreme Court acts as the interpreter of the U.S. Constitution. News reports, blogs, and editorials we read as adults add to this knowledge. Many of us can go further and explain some of the basic interactions among the branches. We know that the laws Congress passes are subject to the president’s veto power and the Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review; we understand that the president names the members of his Cabinet and nominates justices to the Supreme Court, but that the Senate has to confirm these nominations; and we can discuss how the Supreme Court, as the “caretaker” of the Constitution, can declare laws unconstitutional, but that it is up to the legislative and executive branches to enforce these rulings. We bandy around such terms as checks and balances and separation of powers. We talk about majority votes and filibusters in the Senate.

For most of us, however, this is about as far as our knowledge goes. According to newspaper accounts spanning decades, most Americans have trouble naming members of the Supreme Court, or key figures in the congressional leadership, or the members of the president’s Cabinet. Still fewer of us can explain in detail how a bill becomes a law, or the president’s authority in foreign affairs, or how the Supreme Court decides a case. If we ask about the historical development of these institutions and officials and their powers, the numbers of those who understand how our federal government works drops even further.

It is not surprising that most of us do not know a lot about the workings of our government. Government is a large and complex enterprise. It includes thousands of people working on subjects ranging from tax reform to national security, from voting rights to defining and enforcing environmental standards. Much of the work of government, although technically open to the public, is done out of sight and hence out of mind. We may know about those parts of the government that affect us directly—the Social Security Administration for the elderly, the Defense Department for those with family members in the military, or the Supreme Court when the news is filled with such controversial topics as abortion or the right to die or prayer in schools—but our understandings are generally limited to only those parts that directly affect us. Although this state [end page vii] of affairs is understandable, it is also dangerous. Our form of government is a democratic republic. This means that, although elected or appointed officials carry out the duties of government, “We the People of the United States” are the ultimate authority, and not just because we choose those who run the government (or those who appoint the men and women who run the day-to-day business of government). In the end, it is our choices that shape (or, at least, should shape) the scope and function of the federal government. As Abraham Lincoln gracefully puts it, ours is a government “of the people, by the people, for the people.”

Yet what sort of choices can we make if we do not understand the structures, workings, and powers of the federal government? Choices made in ignorance are dangerous choices. When a president goes on TV and claims a power not granted by the Constitution, we need to know that this claim is something new. It might be that what the president is asking for is a reasonable and necessary extension of the powers already held by the executive branch—but it might, on the other hand, be a radical expansion of his powers based on nothing more than his say-so. If we do not understand what is normal, how can we judge whether abnormal and exceptional proposals are necessary or proper? The same is true when pundits and politicians rant on about the dangers of “activist judges.” How can we know what an “activist judge” is if we do not even understand a “normal” judge’s job? What one person calls dangerous activism could be courageous defense of constitutional rights in other people’s eyes—or what one person praises as a creative reading of the Constitution, another person might denounce as an irresponsible and unwise judicial experiment.

This is the point: without knowledge of the way things are supposed to be, how can we judge when the powers of government are being underused, misused, or even abused? The need for this knowledge is the root from which the three volumes of the About Federal Government series have grown. Our goal is to present the federal government as a living, working system made up of real people doing jobs of real importance—not just in the abstract, but for all of us in our daily lives. Knowledge is power, and this is as true today as when Lord Francis Bacon wrote it about four hundred years ago. Understanding how our government works, and how each of its institutions works, and how they interact with one another and with “We the People” is not just something we might need to pass a civics test or a citizenship exam—it is a source of power for us as citizens. Knowing how a bill becomes a law and the many ways that a good idea can be derailed by the process of lawmaking is a source of power—for some day, there may be a bill that you want to see enacted into law, or that you want to prevent being made a law. Knowing the stress points at which a bill is most vulnerable to defeat can give you the opportunity to put pressure where it would do the most good. We can find similar examples for the other two branches as well.

One way of showing the living and evolving nature of the federal government is to place it into its historical context. Our government did not just come into being fully formed. The government we have today is the result of over two hundred years of [end page viii] growth and change, of choices made and laws passed. Much of what we hold to be gospel today, when it comes to the goals and methods and powers of the national government, resulted from our experiences—good and bad—in the past. How can one understand today’s civil rights laws, for example, without first understanding the impact of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction on the structure of our government? Forgetting the past leaves us powerless to deal with the present and the future. A second way to bring our government to life is to focus on the interactions among the three branches of the federal government, as well as between these three branches and the states. Most of the controversy shaping our governing structures grew out of conflicts among the various branches of the federal government, or between the federal government and the states. When Congress fights with the president over budgets or the Supreme Court overturns a popular law passed by Congress and signed by the president, or when a state defies a mandate issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and the president must put that state’s National Guard under his authority to enforce the Court’s decision, those crises clarify the actual working structures of our government. Like flexing a muscle to make it strong, these interactions define the actual impact of our government—not only today, but in the future as well. Finally, we can understand the living nature of the federal government by examining the people who make up that government. Government is not an abstract idea: it is people doing their jobs as best they can. If government can be said to have a personality, it is the direct reflection of the collective personalities of those who work in our government. Hence, when we talk about Congress, we are talking about the people who are elected to the House of Representatives and the Senate and whose values, views, beliefs, and prejudices shape the output of the national legislature. The About Federal Government series integrates all three of these approaches as it sets out the workings and structures of our national government. Written by historians with a keen understanding of the workings of government past and present, these volumes stress the ways in which each of the branches helps form part of a whole system—and the ways that each branch is unique as an institution. Finally, we have given special stress to bringing the people and the history of these branches to life, in the process making clear just how open to our own intervention our government really is. This is our government, and the more we understand how it works, the more real our “ownership” of it will be.

### Impact — Constructive Constraints

#### Absolute affirmative flexibility leaves the negative without meaningful ground to advance well-developed counter-arguments. Establishing boundaries is important because they spur imagination and innovation, improving the quality of debates.

Thomas and Brown 11 — Douglas Thomas, Associate Professor in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California, founding member of the Critical and Cultural Studies division of the National Communication Association, holds a Ph. D. in Communication from the University of Minnesota, and John Seely Brown, Visiting Scholar and Adviser to the Provost at the University of Southern California, independent cochairman of the Deloitte Center for the Edge, former Chief Scientist and Director of the Palo Alto Research Center at Xerox, holds a Ph.D. in Computer and Communication Sciences from the University of Michigan, 2011 (“A Tale of Two Cultures,” *A New Culture of Learning: Cultivating the Imagination for a World of Constant Change*, Published by CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, ISBN 1456458884, p. 35)

Learning Environments

We believe, however, that learning should be viewed in terms of an environment—combined with the rich resources provided by the digital information network—where the context in which learning happens, the boundaries that define it, and the students, teachers, and information within it all coexist and shape each other in a mutually reinforcing way. Here, boundaries serve not only as constraints but also, oftentimes, as catalysts for innovation. Encountering boundaries spurs the imagination to become more active in figuring out novel situations within the constraints of the situation or context.

Environments with well-defined and carefully constructed boundaries are not usually thought of as standardized, nor are they tested and measured. Rather, they can be described as a set of pressures that nudge and guide change. They are substrates for evolution, and they move at varying rates of speed.

#### Their “topicality bad” arguments assume that boundaries constrain innovation. We critique this assumption. “Topicality not framework” is the best way to encourage creative imagination within the confines of a bounded environment. Prefer evidence from education and innovation experts.

Thomas and Brown 11 — Douglas Thomas, Associate Professor in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California, founding member of the Critical and Cultural Studies division of the National Communication Association, holds a Ph. D. in Communication from the University of Minnesota, and John Seely Brown, Visiting Scholar and Adviser to the Provost at the University of Southern California, independent cochairman of the Deloitte Center for the Edge, former Chief Scientist and Director of the Palo Alto Research Center at Xerox, holds a Ph.D. in Computer and Communication Sciences from the University of Michigan, 2011 (“We Know More Than We Can Say,” *A New Culture of Learning: Cultivating the Imagination for a World of Constant Change*, Published by CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, ISBN 1456458884, p. 79)

Inquiry

Conventional wisdom holds that different people learn in different ways. Something is missing from that idea, however, so we offer a corollary: Different people, when presented with exactly the same information in exactly the same way, will learn different things. Most models of education and learning have almost no tolerance for this kind of thing. As a result, teaching tends to focus on eliminating the source of the problem: the student’s imagination.

Imagine a situation where two students are learning to play the piano. The lesson for the day is a Bach prelude. The first student attacks the piano forcefully, banging out each note correctly but with a violent intensity that is uncharacteristic for the style of the piece. The second student seems to view the written score as a loose framework; he varies the rhythm, modifies the melody, and follows his own internal muse. In today’s classroom, the teacher will see two students “doing it wrong.” In the new culture of learning, the teacher will see a budding rock star and a jazz musician.

The story of these students illustrates a fundamental principle of the new culture of learning: Students learn best when they are able to follow their passion and operate within the constraints of a bounded environment. Both of those elements matter. Without the boundary set by the assignment of playing the prelude, there would be no medium for growth. But without the passion, there would be nothing to grow in the medium. Yet the process of discovering one’s passion can be complicated.

#### An “*anything goes*” approach doesn’t work. Clear boundaries are needed precisely because they are challenging.

Thomas and Brown 11 — Douglas Thomas, Associate Professor in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California, founding member of the Critical and Cultural Studies division of the National Communication Association, holds a Ph. D. in Communication from the University of Minnesota, and John Seely Brown, Visiting Scholar and Adviser to the Provost at the University of Southern California, independent cochairman of the Deloitte Center for the Edge, former Chief Scientist and Director of the Palo Alto Research Center at Xerox, holds a Ph.D. in Computer and Communication Sciences from the University of Michigan, 2011 (“We Know More Than We Can Say,” *A New Culture of Learning: Cultivating the Imagination for a World of Constant Change*, Published by CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, ISBN 1456458884, p. 80-81)

Questions and Answers

The new culture of learning is not about unchecked access [end page 80] to information and unbridled passion, however. Left to their own devices, there is no telling what students will do. If you give them a resource like the Internet and ask them to follow their passion, they will probably meander around finding bits and pieces of information that move them from topic to topic—and produce a very haphazard result.

Instead, the new culture of learning is about the kind of tension that develops when students with an interest or passion that they want to explore are faced with a set of constraints that allow them to act only within given boundaries.

### Impact — Simple Truth Thesis

#### Their refusal to affirm the resolution relies on the Simple Truth Thesis and the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis. From this perspective, no reasonable person could *ever* argue that the United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with the PRC because the negative position on this question is so self-evident that there is no room for debate. We critique this assumption. The answers to Big Questions like “should the USFG substantially increase its engagement with the PRC” are *not* simple and self-evident — reasonable people *can* and *should* disagree.

Aikin and Talisse 14 — Scott F. Aikin, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University, and Robert B. Talisse, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the City University of New York, 2014 (“The Simple Truth Thesis,” *Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide To Political Disagreement*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 9780415859059, p. 61-62)

Both camps betray a commitment to the Simple Truth Thesis, the claim that Big Questions always admit simple, obvious, undeniable, and easily-stated answers. The Simple Truth Thesis encourages us to hold that a given truth is so simple and so obvious that only the ignorant, wicked, devious, or benighted could possibly deny it. On a recent occasion, an acquaintance of ours, in the midst of a political conversation, announced that opposing the flat tax was "stupid, evil, or both.” With this statement, she affirmed that, in her opinion, there is no room for reasoned disagreement about the merits of a flat tax. In another recent discussion, a professor of philosophy asserted that there is not even one intelligent defense of the death penalty. Not one, he said.

It's an odd phenomenon. Part of what makes Big Questions so important and, well, big, is precisely the fact that reasonable, sincere, informed, and intelligent persons can disagree over their answers. That is, the Simple Truth Thesis has the effect of deflating Big Questions. But as it does so by casting aspersions on one's opposition, it deflates the questions by inflaming those with whom one disagrees. Consequently, as our popular political commentary accepts the Simple Truth Thesis, there is a great deal of inflammatory rhetoric and righteous indignation, but in fact very little public debate over the issues that matter most. Thus the Big Questions over which we are divided remain unexamined, and our reasons for adopting our different answers are never brought to bear in public discussion. And, moreover, what passes for public argument is nothing like argument at all.

This should come as no surprise. It is clear that one of the direct corollaries to the Simple Truth Thesis is the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis. According to the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis, argument and debate with those with whom one disagrees is a pointless and futile endeavor. The reasoning driving No Reasonable Opposition is simple. [end page 61] If in fact the answer to a given Big Question is a Simple Truth, then there is no opponent of that answer who is not also woefully ignorant, misinformed, misguided, wicked, or worse. In other words, argument concerning a Big Question can be worthwhile only when there is more than one reasonable position regarding the question. And this is precisely what the Simple Truth Thesis denies.

One could argue that it would be a wonderful world were the Simple Truth Thesis true. Our political task would be simply to empower those who know the Simple Truths, and rebuke the fools who do not. But, alas, the Simple Truth Thesis is not true, and consequently the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis must be dismissed as well. In fact, the Simple Truth Thesis is a fairytale—soothing and satisfying, but ultimately unfit for a serious mind. We must recognize that for any Big Question, there are several defensible positions; indeed, as we said above, it is precisely this feature that makes them big questions rather than small or ordinary ones. Of course, to say that a position is defensible is not to say that it's true. One can acknowledge that there are multiple defensible positions in response to a Big Question, and still maintain that there is only one defensible position that is correct. To oppose the Simple Truth Thesis is not to embrace relativism, nor is it to give up on the idea that there are true answers to Big Questions. It is rather to give up on the view that the truth is always simple.

#### This outweighs and turns the case. Even if they are correct about their answer to the Big Question of the resolution, refusing to affirm the topic when assigned to be affirmative demonstrated that they were unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of other answers or perspectives. We must abandon the Simple Truth Thesis and the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis in order for productive debate to occur.

Aikin and Talisse 14 — Scott F. Aikin, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University, and Robert B. Talisse, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the City University of New York, 2014 (“The Simple Truth Thesis,” *Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide To Political Disagreement*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 9780415859059, p. 64-66)

That's the quick and dirty case against relativism. Now notice that none of these arguments bear on the view that there are multiple reasonable answers to Big Questions. In affirming that there are many defensible responses to each Big Question, one claims only that there is a difference between being wrong and being stupid. It is to acknowledge that even smart people make mistakes. Take Plato. From the previous chapters, it should be pretty clear that we think Plato was wrong about a great many things. We already indicated that we think he was wrong about several matters concerning democracy, but that’s just the beginning of the story. We think that Plato was wrong about almost everything. But we also think it’s obvious that Plato was a great philosopher. In fact, we think he was a genius. We admire him, wrestle [end page 64] with his thought, try to criticize his views, and in general take him very, very seriously. But, on nearly every philosophical issue, we believe he was wrong, wrong, wrong.

Holding that there is reasonable opposition, in fact, is a condition for thinking that criticism is possible. Consider that if you think that those who you disagree with are simply stupid, benighted, or evil, you wouldn’t have any arguments to give to them. Criticism of them and their views would be impossible. You would need only to state that they are wrong. But notice that it's only when you take your opponents to be reasonable—people who care about evidence, can see relevant issues, and are able to understand what's at stake in a debate—that you can actually criticize them. Criticism depends upon the background thought that the person you're engaging with has the capacity to reason in good faith. That is not to say that in order to criticize another person, one must endorse or accept their reasons. It means only that you must acknowledge that reasoning (perhaps bad reasoning, or reasoning from false premises) is occurring, and that it's possible to assess and correct it. So to deny the Simple Truth and No Reasonable Opposition theses is not to capitulate to relativism at all. One can reject these theses and yet be committed to there being a single right answer to each Big Question; and one can still hold that those who deny what you believe are dead wrong. One who rejects these theses can still be committed to arguing earnestly with others, and to vigorously critiquing those who are wrong. But most importantly, the denial of the Simple Truth and No Reasonable Opposition theses actually delivers the kind of tolerance that relativism could only promise. Once you’re committed to seeing your opponents as reasonable, intelligent, and sincere, but mistaken, you're less likely to use force or violence to correct them. You're more likely to use arguments to change their minds.

Consequently, even if there is some Big Question whose true answer is p, there can nonetheless be formidable cases made in support of alternative, mistaken, answers. That's because when it comes to Big Questions, there are many different considerations that must be examined, and there will always be reasonable disagreements among intelligent and sincere people about the relative weight of considerations of different kinds. Again, Big Questions are big because they require that we take many, many kinds of consideration into account. Indeed, sometimes the answer to one Big Question depends on how we’ve answered [end page 65] other Big Questions. Things can get extremely complicated very quickly. Yet we are finite creatures with limited cognitive resources, and so it is sometimes hard for us to balance our philosophical checkbooks. Big Questions can dwarf our intelligence. Once we appreciate this, we must recognize that the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis must be abandoned. Even if we have the true answer to a Big Question, there will be room for intelligent, informed, and sincere people to disagree. In such cases, our opponents are mistaken or wrong, but not therefore unintelligent, wicked, untrustworthy, or ignorant. They deserve our attention, and we need to consider what they have to say.

### Impact — Government Heuristic Good

#### Governmentality should be used as a heuristic, not as a description. We can effectively advocate for policy reforms without identifying with the existing state. Arguing that the state is a bad actor in all circumstances overgeneralizes and stifles political agency. Instead of totalizing rejection, we should assess the practical effects of particular policies in specific contexts.

Zanotti 13 — Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Florida International University, 2013 (“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 38, Issue 4, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 289-290)

In this article, I explore the ontological and epistemological assumptions of different versions of governmentality theory and highlight the importance of these assumptions for the conceptualization of political agency. I argue that some versions of governmentality remain trapped in the substantialist ontology they are set to criticize and that this ontological position stifles the possibility of reimagining political agency beyond liberal constraints.

While there are important variations in the way international relations scholars use governmentality theory, for the purpose of my argument I identify two broad trajectories.2 One body of scholarship uses governmentality as a heuristic tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects in the contexts where they are deployed; the other adopts this notion as a descriptive tool to theorize the globally oppressive features of international liberalism. Scholars who use governmentality as a heuristic tool tend to conduct inquiries based upon analyses of practices of government and resistance. These scholars rely on ethnographic inquiries, emphasizes the multifarious ways government works in practice (to include its oppressive trajectories) and the ways uneven interactions of governmental strategies and resistance are contingently enacted. As examples, Didier Bigo, building upon Pierre Bourdieu, has encouraged a research methodology that privileges a relational approach and focuses on practice;3 William Walters has advocated considering governmentality as a research program rather than as a ‘‘depiction of discrete systems of power;’’4 and Michael Merlingen has criticized the downplaying of resistance and the use of ‘‘governmentality’’ as interchangeable with liberalism.5 Many other scholars have engaged in contextualized analyses of governmental tactics and resistance. Oded Lowenheim has shown how ‘‘responsibilization’’ has become an instrument for governing individual travelers through ‘‘travel warnings’’ as well as for ‘‘developing states’’ through performance indicators;6 Wendy Larner and William Walters have questioned accounts of globalization as an ontological dimension of the present and advocated less substantialized accounts that focus on studying the discourses, processes and practices through which globalization is made as a space and a political economy;7 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe have looked at how localized practices of resistance may engage and transform power relations;8 and in my own work, I have studied the deployment of disciplinary and governmental tools for reforming governments in peacekeeping operations and how these practices were hijacked and resisted and by their targets. 9

Scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool focus instead on one particular trajectory of global liberalism, that is on the convergence of knowledge and scrutiny of life processes (or biopolitics) and violence and theorize global liberalism as an extremely effective formation, a coherent and powerful Leviathan, where biopolitical tools and violence come together to serve dominant classes or states’ political agendas. As I will show, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Sergei Prozorov tend to embrace this position.10

The distinction between governmentality as a heuristic and governmentality as a descriptive tool is central for debating political agency. I argue that, notwithstanding their critique of liberalism, scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool rely on the same ontological assumptions as the liberal order they criticize and do move away from Foucault’s focus on historical practices in order to privilege abstract theorizations. By using governmentality as a description of ‘‘liberalism’’ or ‘‘capitalism’’ instead of as a methodology of inquiry on power’s contingent modalities and technologies, these scholars tend to reify a substantialist ontology that ultimately reinforces a liberal conceptualization of subjects and power as standing in a relation of externality and stifles the possibility of reimagining political agency on different grounds. ‘‘Descriptive governmentality’’ constructs a critique of the liberal international order based upon an ontological framework that presupposes that power and subjects are entities possessing qualities that preexist relations. Power [end page 289] is imagined as a ‘‘mighty totality,’’ and subjects as monads endowed with potentia. As a result, the problematique of political agency is portrayed as a quest for the ‘‘liberation’’ of a subject ontologically gifted with a freedom that power inevitably oppresses. In this way, the conceptualization of political agency remains confined within the liberal struggle of ‘‘freedom’’ and ‘‘oppression.’’ Even researchers who adopt a Foucauldian vocabulary end up falling into what Bigo has identified as ‘‘traps’’ of political science and international relations theorizing, specifically essentialization and ahistoricism.11

I argue here that in order to reimagine political agency an ontological and epistemological turn is necessary, one that relies upon a relational ontology. Relational ontological positions question adopting abstract stable entities, such as ‘‘structures,’’ ‘‘power,’’ or ‘‘subjects,’’ as explanations for what happens. Instead, they explore how these pillar concepts of the Western political thought came to being, what kind of practices they facilitate, consolidate and result from, what ambiguities and aporias they contain, and how they are transformed.12 Relational ontologies nurture ‘‘modest’’ conceptualizations of political agency and also question the overwhelming stability of ‘‘mighty totalities,’’ such as for instance the international liberal order or the state. In this framework, political action has more to do with playing with the cards that are dealt to us to produce practical effects in specific contexts than with building idealized ‘‘new totalities’’ where perfect conditions might exist. The political ethics that results from non-substantialist ontological positions is one that privileges ‘‘modest’’ engagements and weights political choices with regard to the consequences and distributive effects they may produce in the context where they are made rather than based upon their universal normative aspirations.13

#### Debating about government policies is a valuable heuristic — we can learn about the state without *being* it. Their radical framework eliminates the potential for political agency and oversimplifies complex, contingent relationships. Instead of rejecting government policies *in general*, we should analyze particular policies.

Zanotti 13 — Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Florida International University, 2013 (“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 38, Issue 4, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 299-300)

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that, notwithstanding their critical stance, scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool remain rooted in substantialist ontologies that see power and subjects as standing in a relation of externality. They also downplay processes of coconstitution and the importance of indeterminacy and ambiguity as the very space where political agency can thrive. In this [end page 299] way, they drastically limit the possibility for imagining political agency outside the liberal straightjacket. They represent international liberal biopolitical and governmental power as a homogenous and totalizing formation whose scripts effectively oppress ‘‘subjects,’’ that are in turn imagined as free ‘‘by nature.’’ Transformations of power modalities through multifarious tactics of hybridization and redescriptions are not considered as options. The complexity of politics is reduced to homogenizing and/or romanticizing narratives and political engagements are reduced to total heroic rejections or to revolutionary moments.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with.

Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84

### Impact — Switch-Side Format Good

#### Switch-side debating prepares students to challenge dominant ideologies, not mindlessly accept them.

English et al. 7 — Eric English, Graduate Student in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, et al., part of the Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group (DAWG)—a consortium of public argument scholars at University of Pittsburgh that includes Gordon R. Mitchell—Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods—Graduate Students in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2007 (“Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, Volume 4, Number 2, June, Available Online at http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf, Accessed 01-19-2010, p. 223-225)

Second, while the pedagogical benefits of switch-side debating for participants are compelling,10 some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 controversy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that the articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a [end page 223] "technology" of liberal participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCarthy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints. The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, "The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time."11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence.

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13

Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. "I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy." As Katyal recounts, "the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team."14

The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as "with us or against us," the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be [end page 224] apparent—the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a "weapon of mass destruction."

#### Switch-side debating facilitates informed deliberation, not American exceptionalism.

Stannard 6 — Matt Stannard, Director of Forensics and Associate Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming, 2006 (“Deliberation, Debate, and Democracy in the Academy and Beyond,” *The Underview*, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, Available Online at http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html, Accessed 06-26-2007)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as J.P. Lacy once pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism."

Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe.

Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas.